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Courts typically accord some level of deference to agency interpretations of 
statutes.  Should that change for a “fighting” regulation that an agency has 
issued during the course of related litigation?  The Treasury Department has 
done that many times, as highlighted by the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
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in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States and 
a series of recent courts of appeals cases that led to a grant of certiorari in 
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States.   
To answer the question of how “fighting regs” and other litigation-oriented 
tax guidance should be treated, this Article first analyzes the law on judicial 
deference to tax authorities generally, making sense of the confused tax-
specific historical approach.  It then considers the context of rulings issued 
during pending litigation.  The Article explains that, following the 2011 
decision in Mayo, deference under the famous Chevron case applies to all 
Treasury regulations issued in accordance with the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  It further argues that Revenue Rulings – formal 
guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service – should receive deference 
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., in accordance with United States v. Mead 
Corp. and Mayo.  The Article proposes that regulations and rulings issued 
during related litigation receive the applicable level of deference (Chevron or 
Skidmore) but that the deference inquiry take into account the retroactivity 
and surprise issues raised by the timing of the guidance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a corporation that sells its own stock at a time when the applicable 
Treasury regulation provides that such sales are tax-free, yet the government 
claims in litigation that the sale should be taxable.  The Treasury Department 
amends the regulation during the litigation to state that such sales are taxable, 
retroactive to the year of the taxpayer’s transaction.  That is essentially what 
happened in Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 and resembles the facts 
of a number of very recent cases.2  Should courts defer to the regulation in 
such a context?   
The question of how much deference courts should accord agency 
interpretations of statutes is an important issue that cuts across distinct areas of 
substantive law, including banking law,3 communications law,4 environmental 
 
1 306 U.S. 110 (1939). 
2 See infra Part III.B (discussing recent courts of appeals cases and the grant of certiorari 
in Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011)).  Regulations 
issued during related litigation are sometimes called “fighting regulations.”  See 
Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 940 F. Supp. 1370, 1388 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
(“Indianapolis Life characterizes [the regulation] as a ‘fighting regulation’ issued for the 
purpose of bolstering the government’s litigation position.”). 
3 See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) (applying 
deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), to the interpretation of the term “visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller)); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 
517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (applying Chevron deference to the Comptroller’s interpretation 
of the word “interest” in the National Bank Act). 
4 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
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law,5 labor law,6 and tax law.7  The level of judicial deference matters because 
greater deference increases the likelihood that an agency regulation or ruling 
will be upheld, which in turn provides agencies with greater discretion in their 
rulemaking.8 
As is well known, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.9 is the leading judicial deference case, setting forth a famously 
deferential two-step test.10  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in a footnote 
in Chevron, “The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the 
 
986 (2005) (applying Chevron deference to the Federal Communication Commission’s 
(FCC’s) classification of broadband cable modem service as “telecommunications service”); 
Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 591-92 (2010) (discussing 
deference to the FCC). 
5 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 (addressing whether the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of a term in the Clean Air Act was 
permissible); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, 
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 767, 768-69 (2008). 
6 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (discussing the 
appropriate level of deference to give to a Department of Labor opinion letter on a provision 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The 
NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and 
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2079-85 (2009) (suggesting that review of 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) actions and judicial deference to the agency 
become more consistent with review of and deference to all federal agency decisions). 
7 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 
711-15 (2011) (applying Chevron to a Treasury regulation issued under the general-
authority provision of the Internal Revenue Code); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2006) 
(“Settling the question of deference toward Treasury regulations carries significant 
implications for both tax jurisprudence and tax policy.”). 
8 See David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 332 (2000) (“[O]ne effect of Chevron’s replacement of the 
variable judicial deference that had been applied to agencies’ legislative rules with a blanket 
rule of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous or silent statutes has 
been to grant agencies vastly greater discretion in resolving statutory ambiguity.”). 
9 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
10 The Court stated, 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). 
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only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even 
the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in 
a judicial proceeding.”11  Thus, Chevron extended substantial deference to 
agency guidance. 
Despite its prominence, Chevron did not necessarily displace agency-
specific precedents.12  In tax cases, courts sometimes applied National Muffler 
Dealers Ass’n v. United States13 – an earlier, tax-specific precedent – instead 
of Chevron.  Which standard to apply in tax cases remained a source of 
confusion until 2011, when the Supreme Court decided Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education & Research v. United States.14  In that case, the Court 
emphasized the importance of consistency between tax and other areas of law, 
holding that Chevron, not National Muffler, applies to tax regulations.15   
Adding to the confusion regarding judicial deference, decades prior to 
Chevron, the Supreme Court decided Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,16 under which 
some agency rulings are merely persuasive.17  In Skidmore, the Court 
explained that the respect accorded a ruling “will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”18  Skidmore therefore 
provides significantly less deference than Chevron does.  
The Supreme Court has applied Skidmore even in post-Chevron cases.  For 
example, in its 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,19 which involved 
a “tariff classification” issued by the United States Customs Service, the 
Supreme Court held that the guidance did not qualify for Chevron deference 
 
11 Id. at 843 n.11. 
12 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1107-08 (2008) (“In forty-nine post-Chevron cases, the Court invoked Beth 
Israel [Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978)] deference and refrained from mentioning 
Chevron, any of the post-Chevron cases, or the famous two-step formula. . . .  [T]he 
application of Beth Israel deference is found not only in labor law . . . but also in 
immigration, treaty interpretation, sentencing, education, and regulated industries.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 524-25 (2011) (discussing some courts’ application of Nat’l Muffler 
Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), instead of  the Chevron/Skidmore 
general administrative law framework). 
13 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
14 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
15 Id. at 712-13. 
16 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also Hasen, supra note 8, at 334 (“Prior to Chevron, 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and its progeny controlled federal courts’ review of agency 
rulemaking.”). 
17 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
18 Id. 
19 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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because it was not promulgated in the exercise of authority to make rules with 
the force of law.20  In the absence of such a delegation, the Mead Court 
determined that the tariff classification was entitled to respect under Skidmore 
“according to its persuasiveness.”21  Although Mead was not a tax case, a 
number of courts and commentators have found its reasoning applicable to 
Revenue Rulings,22 which are official published guidance providing the IRS’s 
interpretation of how the tax law applies to a particular set of facts.23  
One reason deference questions have traditionally been so complicated in 
tax cases is that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of the 
Treasury, of which the IRS is a part, issue several forms of guidance.  Treasury 
regulations, which interpret the Internal Revenue Code (Code), are published 
in the Code of Federal Regulations and “are by far the most prominent and 
carry the greatest legal weight.”24  These regulations may be final, temporary, 
or proposed, and they may be issued under the general authority provision in 
Code section 7805 or under specific authority provided in a particular Code 
section.25  The IRS also issues several forms of guidance, including the 
Revenue Rulings referred to above. 
Not only has the level of judicial deference accorded to these types of 
guidance often been unclear, but the deference question in any particular case 
also can be complicated by the timing of the guidance.  Although many cases 
 
20 Id. at 231-33. 
21 Id. at 221.  The Court remanded for consideration of the amount of respect the ruling 
needed to be accorded.  See id. at 227, 234-35.  Not everyone sees Chevron and Skidmore as 
distinct standards.  The view that they are similar standards is often associated with 
Supreme Court Justice Breyer.  See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In 
Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1248 (2007) (“Justice 
Breyer has long adopted the view that Chevron and Skidmore are functionally similar, with 
Chevron’s emphasis on delegation representing merely another factor for a reviewing court 
to evaluate in deciding whether to defer to an administrative interpretation.”); Jim Rossi, 
Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1138 (2001) (arguing that in his dissent in Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), Justice Breyer “hints, and implicitly endorses, that 
Skidmore can be understood within the architecture of Chevron deference, not as an 
alternative to Chevron deference”); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s 
Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997, 1007 n.56 (2007) (“Justice Breyer appears to view 
Chevron as a special type of Skidmore deference.”). 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 137-142. 
23 See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (2010) (“A ‘Revenue Ruling’ is an official 
interpretation by the Service that has been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.  
Revenue Rulings are issued only by the National Office and are published for the 
information and guidance of taxpayers, Internal Revenue Service officials, and others 
concerned.”); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814 § 3.01 (providing a similar 
definition). 
24 Hickman, supra note 7, at 1538. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
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involve a disagreement about how longstanding guidance applies to the 
taxpayer’s situation, the government has the unique opportunity to issue 
guidance during a pending controversy.   
While it is never easy to determine motivation, particularly that of an entity 
such as the IRS or the Treasury Department, the facts of a particular case in 
litigation may suggest that the case prompted the guidance.  Moreover, 
regardless of the government’s motivation, the timing of guidance may raise 
questions of retroactivity with respect to a completed transaction and/or 
surprise the taxpayer late in litigation.  Should courts consider these factors in 
connection with the deference inquiry? 
This Article addresses that question.  In order to develop a framework for 
the analysis, the Article examines the state of the law on deference in tax cases.  
It then considers whether the deference accorded to a Treasury regulation or 
Revenue Ruling should be reduced if the guidance was a “fighting” regulation 
or ruling – one issued during the controversy between the IRS and the 
taxpayer. 
Part I of the Article reviews the development of deference law applicable to 
tax cases, focusing on where deference precedents in tax cases deviated from 
general administrative law precedents.  In that regard, Part I considers the 
administrative law distinction between two main types of rulemaking – 
legislative and interpretative – and discusses how that distinction has been 
mapped onto tax rulemaking, including Treasury regulations.   
Next, Part II of the Article considers what level of deference should apply to 
Treasury regulations and Revenue Rulings as a general matter.  After 
examining the state of current law, it argues that the generally accepted 
approach of applying Chevron to Treasury regulations and Skidmore to 
Revenue Rulings makes sense.  It further argues that it would be unproductive 
to adopt Mitchell Gans’s proposal26 to provide Treasury regulations deference 
under Skidmore and no deference at all to Revenue Rulings.27  
In Part III, the Article sets up a typology of advocacy-oriented rulings and 
examines the history and state of the law on the treatment of regulations and 
Revenue Rulings issued during litigation.  This Part then proposes that the 
timing of the rule in relation to the litigation and the potential unfairness of 
applying it to that litigation be taken into account under Chevron or Skidmore, 
whichever is applicable.  The Article concludes that it is under these authorities 
that courts should consider timing and retroactivity issues.  This approach has 
the advantage of benefitting from existing jurisprudence and of treating tax 
 
26 Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 731, 792-95 (2002). 
27 In a pre-Mead article, Professor Linda Galler also argued that no deference should be 
accorded Revenue Rulings.  See Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of 
IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 891 (1992).  The Gans proposal is discussed 
infra at text accompanying notes 148-152. 
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cases as much like other cases as possible, as the Supreme Court counseled in 
Mayo. 
I. THE CONFUSED HISTORY OF DEFERENCE TO TAX GUIDANCE 
For years, the case law was murky regarding exactly how much deference to 
give Treasury regulations.  Part of the confusion arose because, as discussed 
below, administrative law recognizes two categories of rules – legislative and 
interpretative – that receive different levels of deference, and it was unclear for 
a long time how those categories were defined with respect to tax regulations.  
This Part discusses deference standards for regulations generally and then for 
tax regulations in particular.  In so doing, it considers the historical 
development of the distinction between legislative and interpretative 
regulations. 
A. The Legislative/Interpretative Distinction Generally 
Under current law, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)28 is the 
principal source of the legislative/interpretative distinction.29  It generally 
requires agencies engaging in “informal” rulemaking30 to give the public 
notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed rules,31 but it excepts from 
 
28 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
29 There are additional reasons the distinction matters: (1) “an agency has the power to 
issue binding legislative rules only if and to the extent Congress has authorized it to do so,” 
and (2) “a legislative rule can impose distinct obligations on members of the public in 
addition to those imposed by statute, as long as the rule is within the scope of rulemaking 
authority conferred on the agency by statute.”  1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:3, at 234 (3d ed. 1994). 
30 Professor David Franklin explains, 
The first [rulemaking] technique [under the APA], so-called “formal” rulemaking, 
involves onerous trial-type hearings and is rarely required unless a specific statute calls 
for rules to be “made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”  Far more 
common is the second technique, variously known as “informal,” “notice-and-
comment,” or “section 553” rulemaking. 
David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 
120 YALE L.J. 276, 282 (2010) (footnote omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556, 557). 
31 The statute provides, 
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, 
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise 
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.  The notice shall include – 
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved. 
 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006). 
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the notice-and-comment requirement “interpretative rules, general statements 
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”32  
Rules that are subject to the notice-and-comment requirement are not given 
a name in the APA.  They are, however, typically referred to as “legislative 
rules”33 because they have essentially the force of a statute.34  The APA thus 
refers to “rules” and “rule making,” not regulations.  Regulations are one type 
of “rule” in that they are a form of agency guidance.35   
The interpretative/legislative distinction predates the APA.36  In the years 
leading up to the enactment of the APA, commentators understood that some 
regulations were issued under authority granted to the agency to make rules 
with the force of law, while others were not.  For example, the Attorney 
General’s Report on Administrative Procedure, published in 1941, stated, “In 
addition to the power to enact legally binding regulations conferred upon many 
of the agencies, all of them may, if they wish, issue interpretations, rulings, or 
opinions upon the laws they administer, without statutory authorization to do 
so.”37  Professor Kenneth Davis explained, “A legislative rule is the product of 
an exercise of delegated legislative power to make law through rules.  An 
interpretative rule is any rule an agency issues without exercising delegated 
legislative power to make law through rules.”38  
In a pre-APA article, Stanley Surrey, then Assistant Legislative Counsel at 
the Treasury Department,39 argued that interpretative regulations generally 
 
32 Id. § 553(b)(A).  There is also a “good cause” exception.  Id. § 553(b)(B). 
33 See Hickman, supra note 7, at 1543 n.23 (“The APA itself does not use the legislative 
term to describe rules subject to the notice and comment requirements.  However, 
explanations of APA provisions and both pre- and post-APA literature and jurisprudence 
use the term in distinguishing such rules from interpretative rules.”). 
34 See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7:8-7:9, at 36, 46-47 
(2d ed. 1979); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of 
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 476-77 (2002) (“Legislative rules 
are those that have the force and effect of law.  From the perspective of agency personnel, 
regulated parties, and courts, these rules have a status akin to that of a statute.”). 
35 See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(1)-(2) (2010) (“The most important rules are issued as 
regulations and Treasury decisions . . . .  Where required by 5 U.S.C. 553 [the 
Administrative Procedure Act] and in such other instances as may be desirable, the 
Commissioner publishes in the Federal Register general notice of proposed rules . . . .”). 
36 See Hickman, supra note 7, at 1566-67. 
37 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 99 (1941), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/pdfdownload/ 
apa1941.pdf. 
38 DAVIS, supra note 34, at § 7:8, at 36. 
39 Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, 
Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 556, 556 n.† (1940).  Surrey later became 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy).  See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside 
the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act 
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1796 (2007). 
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failed to warrant any deference at all: “The interpretative regulations 
considered in their own right enjoy, as respects taxpayers, no greater authority 
as to the meaning of the statutory language interpreted than is possessed by the 
discussions in the tax services or legal periodicals.”40  At that time, however, 
an important exception to this general rule was that, under the legislative 
“reenactment doctrine,”41 reenactment of the statute interpreted by the 
regulation could result in the regulation obtaining force-of-law status42 or, as 
Surrey phrased it, being “alchemized into a statutory command.”43  Surrey 
explained the legislative reenactment doctrine as follows: “[B]y virtue of such 
reenactment, ‘under the established rule Congress must be taken to have 
approved the administrative construction and thereby to have given it the force 
of law.’” 44   
The legislative reenactment doctrine was well-accepted at the time.45  
However, the doctrine reflected the fact that, until 1939, whenever Congress 
amended the tax laws, which it did fairly often, it recodified the entire statute, 
rather than simply leaving untouched sections that were not amended.46  Erwin 
Griswold explained that “reenactment of the entire statute, including the 
unamended portions as well as those which have been changed[,] . . . was done 
simply as a matter of convenience.”47  In 1939, Congress stopped that practice 
when it adopted the Internal Revenue Code.48   
 
40 Surrey, supra note 39, at 558; see also Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and 
the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 261 (1940) (“The Treasury’s construction of 
the statute, as set forth in interpretative regulations, is binding as a matter of law (it is too 
often not binding as a matter of practice) upon the Treasury’s officers and agents; but it is 
not binding upon taxpayers.”).  With respect to judicial review of interpretative regulations, 
Alvord wrote, 
[W]here an interpretative regulation is involved, the ultimate question before the courts 
is: What does the statute mean? . . .  If the statutory meaning is clear, neither legislative 
nor executive constructions to the contrary will have any force.  However, if the statute 
is ambiguous, the regulations, as contemporaneous constructions of the statute by those 
charged with executing it, are and properly should be given weight by the courts, just 
as committee reports and other legislative interpretations will be consulted.  Such aids 
to interpretation are often helpful, but never controlling. 
Id. at 261-62 (footnotes omitted). 
41 Hickman, supra note 7, at 1570-71. 
42 Surrey, supra note 39, at 559; see also Hickman, supra note 7, at 1571 (footnote 
omitted) (“Although the common understanding was that general authority Treasury 
regulations were interpretative and nonbinding, the Court’s adherence to a strong form of 
the reenactment doctrine through the 1930s meant that an entire generation of general 
authority regulations was given virtually automatic legislative characterization, and 
consequently the force and effect of law, on reenactment doctrine grounds.”). 
43 Surrey, supra note 39, at 559. 
44 Id. (quoting Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1939)). 
45 Id.; see also Hickman, supra note 7, at 1570-71. 
46 Hickman, supra note 7, at 1571. 
47 Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398, 
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Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,49 the case mentioned in the 
Introduction,50 was decided in 1939 and was “probably the high-water mark”51 
of the legislative reenactment doctrine.  Later the same year, the Supreme 
Court pulled back a bit in Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.,52 stating that the 
doctrine “does not mean that a regulation interpreting a provision of one act 
becomes frozen into another act merely by reenactment of that provision, so 
that that administrative interpretation cannot be changed prospectively through 
exercise of appropriate rule-making powers.”53  And, by 1941, the Court was 
calling the legislative reenactment doctrine “no more than an aid in statutory 
construction.”54 
At least in the 1940s, there was some argument that legislative regulations 
had to be enacted pursuant to a specific grant of power,55 but that view may not 
 
402 (1941). 
48 See Alvord, supra note 40, at 263 (“It should be noted that the adoption of the Internal 
Revenue Code by Congress at the last session has greatly narrowed the scope of legislative 
approval.  Henceforth, amendments of the revenue laws will probably be made by amending 
specific sections of the Code, and the practice of reenacting the basic statute may be 
abandoned.” (footnotes omitted)); Griswold, supra note 47, at 402.  Stanley Surrey 
questioned the assumption underlying the legislative reenactment doctrine, noting that 
Congress often does not consider all of the sections it reenacts.  Surrey, supra note 39, at 
563. 
49 306 U.S. 110 (1939). 
50 See supra text accompanying note 1.  The R.J. Reynolds case is discussed further 
below.  See infra text accompanying notes 185-194. 
51 Louis Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HARV. L. 
REV. 477, 529 (1945). 
52 308 U.S. 90 (1939). 
53 Id. at 100.  The Court stated that the regulation in question was promulgated under a 
specific delegation of authority in Code section 23, rather than the general delegation in 
section 62.  See id. at 102.  Contemporaneous commentators expressed uncertainty as to 
whether the case involved a legislative regulation.  Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative 
Rules – Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J.  919, 956 (1948) (“[T]he 
Court seemingly assumed, perhaps erroneously, that the regulation was legislative . . . .”); 
Surrey, supra note 39, at 572 (“If Section 23(1) did extend to Section 114(b)(3), as the 
Court apparently decided, . . . it had before it a legislative regulation. . . .  But if Section 
23(1) did not extend to Section 114(b)(3) – and the Court seems not too sure of their 
relationship [–] . . . only an interpretative regulation is involved . . . .”).  Another 
commentator “convincingly demonstrates that another section was the subject of 
interpretation and that the rule was interpretative rather than legislative.”  Davis, supra, at 
956 n.185; see also Alvord, supra note 40, at 256-57. 
54 Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432 (1941). 
55 See Hickman, supra note 7, at 1567 (“A general rulemaking grant that authorized 
binding regulations carrying the force and effect of law would be inconsistent with the 
nondelegation doctrine and thus constitutionally invalid.”); see also Alvord, supra note 40, 
at 260-61; Surrey, supra note 39, at 557-58.  Under the nondelegation doctrine, it was 
thought that Congress could not delegate its power.  See United States v. Shreveport Grain 
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have been widely accepted.  Citing two tax articles, Kenneth Davis stated in 
1948, “[A]ssertions have been made that authority to make legislative rules 
must be specifically delegated . . . .”56  He disagreed: “[B]oth legislative and 
interpretative rules may clearly rest upon statutory authority which is either 
express or implied.”57 
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts have an interesting explanation for how 
courts and agencies at the time determined which rules were legislative ones.  
They argue that “from the second decade of the twentieth century through the 
enactment of the APA,”58 there was a drafting convention that Congress 
followed: 
If Congress specified in the statute that a violation of agency rules would 
subject the offending party to some sanction – for example, a civil or 
criminal penalty; loss of a permit, license, or benefits; or other adverse 
legal consequences – then the grant conferred power to make rules with 
the force of law.  Conversely, if Congress made no provision for 
 
& Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“That the legislative power of Congress cannot be 
delegated is, of course, clear.”).  “[T]he nondelegation doctrine died gradually, and the rise 
of legislative rules came during its dying period.”  DAVIS, supra note 34, § 7:9, at 44.  Both 
of the 1940 articles cited by Hickman focused on Treasury regulations and argued that 
general authority regulations are necessarily interpretative.  Alvord states, 
[S]ection [62] contains no Congressional standard or guide of any kind, nor does the 
income tax title of the Code anywhere set forth a standard for administrative action to 
which Section 62 might be related.  If this section were to be construed as conferring 
on the Commissioner an unlimited power to make rules having the force and effect of 
law, it would be a plainly unconstitutional delegation of power.  Accordingly, the 
courts have uniformly regarded the general Treasury regulations as merely stating the 
Treasury’s construction of the statute. 
Alvord, supra note 40, at 260 (footnotes omitted).  Surrey states, 
While Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code, like its counterpart in prior Revenue 
Acts, provides that “The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall 
prescribe and publish all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this 
chapter,” this provision does not invest interpretative regulations with the force of law.  
The standard of “needful . . . for the enforcement” of a revenue act would hardly seem 
adequate in this regard to support a delegation of legislative power.  The issuance of 
interpretative regulations would be equally valid without such a section and they gain 
nothing by it. 
Surrey, supra note 39, at 557-58 (footnote omitted) (quoting I.R.C. § 62 (1939)). 
56 Davis, supra note 53, at 929 (citing Alvord, supra note 40, at 259); see Robert C. 
Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 377, 384-85 
(1941). 
57 Davis, supra note 53, at 929.  Davis further explained that “[a]lthough the power to 
issue interpretative regulations is commonly inherent or implied, it may be expressly 
conferred,” and he pointed to the general authority statute in the Internal Revenue Code as 
an example of such an express delegation of authority.  Id. at 930. 
58 Merrill & Watts, supra note 34, at 472. 
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sanctions for rule violations, the grant authorized only procedural or 
interpretive rules.59  
Merrill and Watts acknowledge that “modern administrative lawyers are not 
aware of” the existence of this convention60 and argue that that is because 
“during the time the convention was developed and followed by Congress, no 
appellate court rendered a decision that required it to determine whether 
Congress had conferred authority on an agency to make rules with the force of 
law.”61 
Modern appellate courts “have held that two conditions must be satisfied: 
‘Congress has delegated legislative power to the agency and . . . the agency 
intended to exercise that power in promulgating the rule.’”62  However, “[i]n 
practice, the decisions that apply this two-part test focus almost exclusively on 
the second part – whether the agency intended to make a rule that has the force 
and effect of law. . . .”63   
Thus, there is a distinction between legislative and interpretative rules that 
has both historical significance and continuing importance under the APA.  
The next section discusses how Treasury regulations have traditionally been 
characterized, as well as the current understanding of their status under the 
APA. 
B. Categorizing Treasury Regulations 
As indicated above, Treasury regulations come in three varieties: proposed, 
final, and temporary.  Treasury regulations usually are issued in proposed form 
before being finalized.64  This provides the government with an opportunity for 
 
59 Id.; cf. Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 
(1940) (“If the statute provides that nonconformance to the regulation is to result in the 
imposition of legal sanctions specified by Congress, then the regulation is legislative.”).  
Merrill and Watts argue, 
The implications of Lee’s Georgetown article are considerable.  His comments about 
how one identifies a grant of legislative, as opposed to interpretive, rulemaking 
authority exactly track the convention we have described.  This understanding almost 
certainly reflects his extensive tenure as an attorney in the House and Senate Offices of 
Legislative Counsel – a tenure that coincided with the period during which Congress 
routinely observed the convention. 
Merrill & Watts, supra note 34, at 522. 
60 Merrill & Watts, supra note 34, at 472. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 478 (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 
1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
63 Id. 
64 See Hickman, supra note 39, at 1748 (“With most of its regulatory efforts, Treasury at 
some point does publish an NPRM [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking] in the Federal 
Register, request and consider public comments, and issue its final regulations with a 
detailed explanatory preamble.”). 
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feedback from affected parties before promulgating final regulations.65  
Sometimes Treasury will postpone finalizing regulations in response to 
comments.66 
Some regulations are issued in temporary form.  The Code currently 
provides that temporary regulations expire in three years67 and that “any 
temporary regulation issued by the Secretary shall also be issued as a proposed 
regulation.”68  The IRS has instructed its attorneys to follow temporary 
regulations, even if the government has subsequently issued proposed 
regulations that would resolve an issue in the government’s favor. 69 
Another distinction among Treasury regulations is whether they were issued 
under the authority of a specific Code section or under the general delegation 
of authority in Code section 7805, which provides, 
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person 
other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the 
Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be 
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal 
revenue.70 
Many regulations are issued under section 7805, but others are issued under 
the authority of specific provisions.  For example, Code section 6103, on the 
confidentiality of tax returns and return information, provides, “The Secretary 
is authorized to prescribe such other regulations as are necessary to carry out 
 
65 See id.  Some regulations receive substantial comments.  See, e.g., Reporting of Gross 
Proceeds Payments to Attorneys, T.D. 9270, 2006-2 C.B. 237, at 238 (2006), reprinted in 
Reporting of Gross Proceeds Payments to Attorneys, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 12, 2006, 
LEXIS, 2006 TNT 134-6 (“The IRS received written comments on the 1999 proposed 
regulations, and held a public hearing on September 22, 1999.  After considering those 
comments and the testimony at the public hearing, the IRS and the Treasury Department 
decided to amend and repropose regulations under sections 6041 and 6045(f). . . .  A number 
of written comments were received in connection with the reproposed regulations. . . .  In 
addition to written comments, a number of telephone calls were received with questions and 
comments regarding the reproposed regulations.”). 
66 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2001-7, 2001-1 C.B. 374, available at http://www.irs.gov 
/pub/irs-drop/n-01-7.pdf (“Because the [Internal Revenue] Service is continuing to study the 
many comments regarding the NPRM under § 6045(f), the Service intends to further delay 
the effective date of § 1.6045-5.”). 
67 I.R.C. § 7805(e)(2) (2006). 
68 Id. § 7805(e)(1).  Code section 7805(e) is effective with respect to regulations issued 
after November 20, 1988.  Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-647, Title VI, § 6232(b), 102 Stat. 3342, 3735. 
69 I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003), available at LEXIS, 2003 
TNT 93-7 (providing as an example, “if the application of the proposed regulations would 
have an adverse effect on the taxpayer . . . , then the proposed regulations should not be 
applied in that situation”). 
70 I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
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the provisions of this section.”71  Treasury usually, but not always, follows 
notice-and-comment procedures with respect to general-authority regulations.72  
It also sometimes cites both section 7805 and a specific Code section to 
support a single regulation.73 
Prior to the APA, there was an understanding specific to tax law that 
general-authority regulations were interpretative and that specific-authority 
regulations were legislative.  For example, in a 1940 article, Stanley Surrey 
considered the question of what level of deference courts should accord the 
regulation that was at issue in R.J. Reynolds,74 which the Treasury had 
amended during the R.J. Reynolds litigation and sought to apply retroactively 
to tax the corporate taxpayer’s sale of its own stock.75  The regulation had been 
issued under the Code’s general authority provision, which was then section 
62.76  Before addressing the deference question, Surrey drew the 
legislative/interpretative distinction: 
The preponderant majority of the Regulations are what may be termed 
“interpretative regulations”.  Such Regulations constitute the 
Department’s interpretations of the Revenue Act and serve to guide the 
personnel of the Bureau and the taxpaying public in the application of the 
law. . . .  [T]hese guides are of some assistance to taxpayers.  But they 
still remain no more than the Department’s construction of the Revenue 
Act.77 
Surrey then considered the regulations in question, making a statutory 
argument that regulations promulgated under the general authority provision of 
the Code were necessarily interpretative.  His argument generally was that 
“[r]egulations . . . specifically authorized must obviously be taken to possess 
 
71 Id. § 6103(q).  For a section 6103 regulation, see Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(9)-1 
(2011). 
72 See Hickman, supra note 39, at 1748-49 (finding that, from January 1, 2003, through 
December 31, 2005, the IRS omitted notice and comment with respect to 11 of 232 
rulemaking projects, and in 84 others it issued temporary regulations at the same time as its 
notice of proposed rulemaking). 
73 See id. at 1752.  In the regulations Professor Hickman studied, 
Treasury only cited specific as well as general authority in 1 of the 11 projects in which 
it skipped pre-promulgation notice and comment altogether.  Yet Treasury relied upon 
specific as well as general rulemaking authority in 36.5% of projects and general 
authority only in 63.5% of projects in which it followed the traditional process of 
issuing the NPRM, taking comments, and then issuing final regulations. 
Id. 
74 Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds, 306 U.S. 110 (1939). 
75 Surrey, supra note 39, at 556-57; see also supra text accompanying note 1.  R.J. 
Reynolds is also discussed in further detail below.  See infra text accompanying notes 185-
194. 
76 See Surrey, supra note 39, at 557. 
77 Id. at 557. 
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different attributes than those issued under Section 62 [the general authority 
provision], for otherwise the careful particularization of Congress in these 
other sections would be without meaning.”78  He argued that only the 
regulations issued under the authority of a specific section were “legislative 
regulations.”79 
Surrey was not alone in arguing that tax regulations issued under the general 
authority of section 62 were interpretative regulations.  Another commentator, 
Ellsworth Alvord, also writing in 1940, argued that it would be 
unconstitutional for the general-authority provision, which “contains no 
Congressional standard or guide of any kind,” to “confer[] on the 
Commissioner an unlimited power to make rules having the force and effect of 
law.”80  
In their 2002 article, Merrill and Watts argued that the general-
authority/specific-authority distinction tax scholars drew is consistent with the 
original drafting convention, because initially Congress did not attach statutory 
sanctions to violations of regulations promulgated under the general-authority 
provision.81  They also argued that the general/specific distinction by tax 
commentators reflected an imperfect understanding of the basis of the 
legislative/interpretative paradigm: 
Surrey had worked in the Treasury Department and was undoubtedly 
familiar with the received understanding that section 7805(a) authorizes 
only interpretive rules.  He sought an explanation for this assumption that 
fit the facts of the tax world, and came up with the general/specific 
distinction.  Since there was no judicial opinion or other written source 
that contradicted this explanation, and Surrey’s arguments were at least 
superficially plausible, his explanation became the conventional wisdom 
of the tax world.82 
 
78 Id. at 558; see also Alvord, supra note 40, at 257 (“Obviously, some difference was 
intended by Congress, or it would not have been necessary to grant a specific regulatory 
power in Section 23(1) in addition to the general power contained in Section 62.  It is 
submitted that this difference is that Congress intended to confer a legislative power in 
Section 23(1), to prescribe the details of a reasonable depletion allowance, and an 
interpretative power in Section 62, to assist in the execution of the statute by administrative 
officials.”). 
79 Surrey, supra note 39, at 558. 
80 Alvord, supra note 40, at 260. 
81 Merrill & Watts, supra note 34, at 571-73.  For example, a 1940 article by Frederic 
Lee – who had been “an attorney in the House and Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel” – 
argued that legislative regulations were ones in which “the statute provides that 
nonconformance to the regulation is to result in the imposition of legal sanctions specified 
by Congress.”  Id. at 522.  Lee stated that “where taxes are directed to be computed on the 
basis of such regulations,” they are legislative.  Lee, supra note 59, at 20. 
82 Merrill & Watts, supra note 34, at 575. 
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The categorization of specific-authority Treasury regulations as “legislative” 
and general-authority regulations as “interpretative” survived the APA.  For 
example, Professor Davis stated in 1948, 
A leading example of interpretative regulations is the huge bulk of tax 
regulations issued by the Treasury Department, most of which now rest 
upon [the general delegation section] . . . of the Internal Revenue 
Code . . . .  But many provisions of the tax regulations (one commentator 
counted 56 in the income tax law in 1940) are legislative rules, because 
they spring from grants of power to create new law.83 
In two cases decided in the early 1980s, Rowan Cos. v. United States84 and 
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,85 even the Supreme Court adopted that 
approach.86  After decades of silence on the issue, however, the Supreme Court 
rejected that distinction in its 2011 Mayo decision87: 
Since Rowan and Vogel were decided . . . the administrative landscape 
has changed significantly.  We have held that Chevron deference is 
appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise 
of that authority.” . . .  Our inquiry in that regard does not turn on whether 
Congress’s delegation of authority was general or specific.88 
The persistence of tax exceptionalism in this area for several decades is 
probably an example of the “silo effect” that can result from attorney 
specialization.89  Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court aligned the approach 
 
83 Davis, supra note 53, at 930 (footnotes omitted) (citing Alvord, supra note 40, at 258). 
84 452 U.S. 247 (1981). 
85 455 U.S. 16 (1982). 
86 Professors Merrill and Watts explain, 
[I]n Rowan Cos. v. United States, the Court noted that “the Commissioner interpreted 
Congress’ definition [of the word ‘wages’] only under his general authority to 
‘prescribe all needful rules.’ 26 U.S.C. 7805(a).”  Because the regulation was merely 
interpretive, the Court held that it deserved “less deference than a regulation issued 
under a specific grant of authority.”  Similarly, in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 
the Court considered a regulation, issued by the Commissioner under section 7805(a), 
which interpreted the statutory term “brother-sister controlled group.”  The Court again 
observed that because the Commissioner had issued the regulation under his general 
rulemaking grant, the interpretation was entitled to “less deference than a regulation 
issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a 
method of executing a statutory provision.” 
Merrill & Watts, supra note 34, at 573 (quoting Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. at 24 (1982); 
Rowan Cos., 452 U.S. at 253) (footnotes omitted). 
87 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
88 Id. at 713-14 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). 
89 See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 501 (referring to “a phrase commonly used 
in the literature concerning the operation of large organizations to describe the tendency of 
subdivisions within organizations to develop their own bureaucratic imperatives that create 
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to tax cases to administrative law’s approach to other cases.90  Moreover, the 
result in tax cases is not necessarily inconsistent with Merrill and Watts’s 
analysis.  Kristin Hickman has pointed out that if we were to follow the 
convention Merrill and Watts espouse, the result in tax cases today would 
likely be to find all Treasury regulations legislative because the Code imposes 
a penalty on “[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations”91 without any 
distinction between types of regulations.92 
II. WHAT LEVEL OF DEFERENCE DO TAX AUTHORITIES GENERALLY 
WARRANT? 
A. Treasury Regulations 
Until recently, the case law was unclear as to whether Chevron93 applies in 
tax cases.  In Chevron, as discussed above, the Supreme Court set forth a 
famously deferential two-step test.94  Prior to deciding Chevron, however, the 
Court had applied a somewhat different standard in a tax-specific case, 
National Muffler,95 and the Court continued citing National Muffler in post-
Chevron cases.96  The reason for this once again may be the perpetuation of 
 
obstacles to information sharing and other forms of cooperation”); see also Eskridge & 
Baer, supra note 12, at 1108-09. 
90 See infra text accompanying notes 93-98. 
91 I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(1) (2006). 
92 Hickman, supra note 7, at 1604-05.  Hickman remarks, 
It may or may not be fair to presume that Congress appreciated the potential 
consequences to judicial deference of using the “rules and regulations” terminology in 
the penalty provision.  It is notable, however, that Congress used the same “rules and 
regulations” language in both I.R.C. § 6662 and I.R.C. § 7805(a); and Treasury’s 
regulations interpreting § 6662 do not distinguish between specific authority and 
general authority Treasury regulations in prescribing § 6662’s applicability. 
Id. at 1605. 
93 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
94 Id. at 842-43; see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
95 Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).  In National 
Muffler, the Court stated, 
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in 
a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain 
language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.  A regulation may have particular 
force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those 
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent.  If the regulation dates from a 
later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.  Other relevant 
considerations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance 
placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of 
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the 
statute. 
Id. at 477. 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001); 
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specialized precedents, particularly in tax law.97  However, the Supreme Court 
recently abandoned National Muffler, stating in Mayo that “[i]n the absence 
of . . . justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.”98 
After Chevron but before Mayo, the Supreme Court added a layer of 
analysis in United States v. Mead Corp.99  In Mead, the Court stated that 
Chevron applies  
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally 
to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.  
Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional 
intent.100 
 
Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991). 
 This approach is not unique to tax cases.  See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 12, at 1106 
(“Prior to Chevron, the Court had articulated numerous agency-specific deference regimes 
that in form and substance foreshadowed the Chevron test.  Invocation of these cases, which 
resemble and presage Chevron’s reasonability review of agency interpretations when 
statutes are ambiguous, has continued during the Chevron era.”).  Eskridge and Baer cite 
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978), as an example.  See  Eskridge & Baer, 
supra note 12, at 1106-07. 
97 Professors Eskridge and Baer explain, 
[S]pecialized practices . . . prefer their particular deference precedents and continue to 
cite them, often leading the Court to follow suit.  The best example of this phenomenon 
is tax (always a special case, concededly).  There is a long-standing consensus among 
the tax bar that the Internal Revenue Code’s general delegation of authority to the 
Internal Revenue Service (section 7805) is not a general lawmaking delegation, in 
contrast to the many particular delegations.  Hence, the Court rarely applies Chevron to 
IRS interpretations.  If a deference regime is applied, it is usually the pre-Chevron 
regime associated with National Muffler Dealers v. United States. 
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 12, at 1108-09 (footnotes omitted). 
98 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). 
99 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
100 Id. at 226-27.  One scholar has argued that Mead has made a mess of “the question 
[of] when an agency is entitled to Chevron deference for procedures other than notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.” Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has 
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2005).  Another 
scholar has argued that Mead actually did not change the Supreme Court’s practice of when 
to apply Chevron: 
Even after Mead, the Supreme Court continues to apply Chevron deference only in 
contexts that fall within the scope of Chevron’s original consensus.  Under the pretext 
of reconstructing Congress’s intent, the Court has granted Chevron deference where 
agency decision-making processes satisfy five core factors: (1) congressionally 
delegated authority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and 
accountability, (4) deliberative rationality, and (5) national uniformity.  Contrary to 
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This suggests that all tax regulations issued by the Treasury Department, 
whether under general or specific authority, are entitled to Chevron deference, 
at least if they were promulgated with notice and comment.101  It is well 
accepted102 that the Treasury Department has the power “to make rules 
carrying the force of law”103 and that rules promulgated using the notice-and-
comment procedure are “promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”104  
Mayo confirmed that: 
 
conventional wisdom, none of these overlapping rationales can be properly considered 
redundant; since the Court decided Mead, it has consistently withheld Chevron 
deference when any one of these core rationales is not satisfied.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court continues to honor Chevron’s consensus under the veil of Mead’s delegation 
fiction. 
Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2008) (footnote 
omitted).  But see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 
275 (2011) (stating that “[b]y treating constitutional justifications and policy considerations 
on an equal footing, this understanding forfeits any potential to explain how the factors that 
bear on this question should fit together in resolving it,” and arguing that “the foundation for 
the Chevron doctrine is anchored in the separation of powers as manifested by the structure 
of the Constitution and Article III’s assignment of the judicial powers”).   
 Treasury regulations appear to satisfy Professor Criddle’s five factors, given the express 
delegations in the Code to the Treasury, Treasury’s expertise, the fact that it has no less 
accountability than other agencies, the deliberative process Treasury regulations go through, 
and the national uniformity of Treasury rulemaking.  Professor Seidenfeld argued that his 
Article III-based “foundation for Chevron justifies factors akin to those used in Mead more 
than does the legislative intent foundation on which that case relied.”  Seidenfeld, supra, at 
301.  His analysis would reach different results from Mead in some cases.  Id. at 302. 
101 Cf. Criddle, supra note 100, at 1299 (“Justice Stevens’s singular achievement in 
Chevron was to construct a consensus in favor of flexible agency administration in contexts 
where agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to interpret ambiguous 
statutory provisions.”). 
102 See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1153, 1158-59 (2008) (“Congress, Treasury, and taxpayers all operate with the 
understanding that Treasury regulations, whether temporary or final, are legally binding on 
both taxpayers and the government.”). 
103 Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).  Mead further stated, “We have recognized a 
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces 
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”  Id. at 229. 
104 Id. at 227; see also id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress 
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively 
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force. . . .  Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases 
applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or 
formal adjudication.” (citation omitted)). 
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The Department issued the . . . rule pursuant to the explicit authorization 
to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  We have found such “express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking” to be “a very good 
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment.” . . .  The Department 
issued the . . . rule only after notice-and-comment procedures, . . . again a 
consideration identified in our precedents as a “significant” sign that a 
rule merits Chevron deference.105 
The Mead Court did recognize the possibility that a rule issued without 
notice and comment, at least where “no such administrative formality was 
required,”106 could still be subject to Chevron deference107 but did not find 
Chevron deference applicable to the Customs ruling at issue.108  Thus, the 
statement in Mead was dicta, but Mead expressly did not overturn cases 
finding Chevron deference without notice and comment.  In addition, the Mead 
Court stated, “The authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s 
practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-
comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that 
Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference 
claimed for them here.”109   
Thus, it appears that, in cases involving informal rulemaking rather than 
formal rulemaking or formal adjudication, notice and comment and Chevron 
deference are largely, though not entirely, coterminous.110  In fact, in the 
 
105 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011) 
(quoting I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006)); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-231). 
106 Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
107 See id. at 230-31 (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron 
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes 
found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was 
required and none was afforded, see, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 . . . (1995).  The fact that the tariff classification here was not a 
product of such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
108 See id. at 231 (“No matter which angle we choose for viewing the Customs ruling 
letter in this case, it fails to qualify under Chevron.”). 
109 Id.; see also Criddle, supra note 100, at 1305-06 (“Unlike the notice-and-comment 
procedures in Chevron, the Customs Service’s decision-making procedures were not 
conducive to open public deliberation, lacked precedential authority, and did not require the 
Superintendent’s contemporaneous approval.”). 
110 See Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury 
Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment 
Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248, 276-77 (2003) (“The 
Supreme Court . . . did note that ‘the framework of deference set forth in Chevron does 
apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regulation.’ . . .  But, when coupled with the 
emphasis the Court places on the notice-and-comment process, a strong argument can be 
made that the Court was referring only to ‘an agency interpretation contained in a 
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passage from Mayo quoted above, the Supreme Court cited Mead for the 
proposition that “notice-and-comment procedures . . . [are] a consideration 
identified in our precedents as a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits Chevron 
deference.”111 
Mayo involved a final regulation, so the Court did not face or determine the 
level of deference to be accorded temporary regulations.  Temporary 
regulations are similar to final regulations, but they typically are issued without 
prior notice and comment.112  Comments after temporary regulations have been 
promulgated may not be the same or have the same impact as comments on 
proposed regulations, because temporary regulations have already taken 
effect.113   
In 2004, the ABA Task Force on Judicial Deference advocated treating 
temporary regulations the same as final regulations “provided that the 
promulgation of such regulations meets the good cause standards as specified 
in the Administrative Procedure Act for promulgating regulations without 
notice and comment.”114  The APA’s “good cause” exception applies when the 
agency finds and states “that notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”115  Some 
scholars have argued that the Treasury over-relies on this exception.116  
 
regulation’ that also completes the notice-and-comment process.” (quoting Christensen v. 
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
111 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011) 
(quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-231). 
112 See Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial 
Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 728 (2004) (“Temporary regulations, whether legislative or 
interpretive, are issued without notice and comment.”). 
113 See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary 
Regulations, 44 TAX LAW 343, 366-67 (1991) (“Once an agency has decided on a definitive 
rule and the rule has gone into effect, the staff may be less willing to make substantial 
alterations in the rule (and retrain enforcement personnel) in response to comments that 
suggest drastic changes in the rule. . . .  Indeed, a post-effective comment period is little 
more than a petition for modification of a rule – a right that all persons have whether the 
agency asks for post-effective comments or not.” (footnote omitted)). 
114 Salem et al., supra note 112, at 719. 
115 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006). 
116 See Asimow, supra note 113, at 348 (citing cases invalidating temporary rules 
promulgated under the “good cause” exception).  “[M]any of the Treasury’s claims under 
the good cause exception are unlikely to be sustained.  Numerous judicial decisions, well 
supported by the legislative history, establish that the good cause provision is narrowly 
construed.”  Id.; see Hickman, supra note 39, at 1731 (“Treasury may on occasion have a 
reasonable basis for claiming good cause; but Treasury’s reliance on the good cause 
exception is typically poorly justified and often misplaced in light of jurisprudential 
trends.”).  Professor Michael Asimow explains, 
Certainly some tax regulations meet the good cause test.  For example, temporary 
regulations may be needed to prevent serious economic dislocations, forestall massive 
tax avoidance, or to carry out Congressional intent for immediate implementation.  It is 
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Although, as a general matter, failing to follow the notice-and-comment 
procedures of the APA raises the possibility that a regulation will be 
invalidated,117 the ABA Task Force on Judicial Deference contemplated the 
possibility that courts could find that notice and comment is not a requirement 
for temporary tax regulations.118  Accordingly, the Task Force advocated 
applying Skidmore to temporary regulations in which the IRS cannot justify the 
absence of notice and comment, “since the deliberative process rises at least to 
the level of a revenue ruling.”119   
Of course, Mayo made clear that although notice and comment is 
“significant,” it is not a prerequisite for Chevron deference.  Recently, in Beard 
v. Commissioner,120 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta 
that it would have applied Chevron deference to temporary regulations.121  The 
court noted that the absence of notice and comment is not an absolute bar to 
the application of Chevron, although, instead of Mayo, it cited a 2002 Supreme 
Court case involving Social Security Administration regulations.122  The issue 
of the deference to be accorded temporary regulations remains to be decided, 
but, under Mayo, and as recommended by the ABA Task Force on Judicial 
Deference, courts should be reluctant to apply Chevron to regulations that did 
not benefit from notice and comment or a similar process.123 
B. Revenue Rulings 
As mentioned above, the IRS issues official, published guidance in the form 
of Revenue Rulings.124  Revenue Rulings are issued under different procedures 
than are Treasury Regulations.  Most notably, they “typically are not presented 
 
unlikely, however, that the good cause exemption applies in the case of . . . 
numerous . . . situations in which the Treasury waited several years to adopt temporary 
regulations and made only generalized claims that temporary regulations were justified 
by a need for immediate guidance. 
Asimow, supra note 113, at 349-50 (footnotes omitted). 
117 See Asimow, supra note 113, at 349 n.34 (citing cases invalidating temporary rules 
promulgated under the “good cause” exception). 
118 See Salem et al., supra note 112, at 742 (stating that, with regard to temporary 
regulations, “[i]f . . . this Report’s position that all IRS regulations are legislative rules 
within the meaning of the APA is rejected, courts may have a difficult time enforcing the 
‘good cause’ requirement of the APA”). 
119 Id. 
120 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. pending, No. 10-1553 (filed June 23, 
2011). 
121 Id. at 623 (“[W]e need not reach this issue.  However, we would have been inclined to 
grant the temporary regulation Chevron deference . . . .”). 
122 Id. (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)). 
123 The questions presented to the Supreme Court in United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC do not directly raise this issue, though the Supreme Court could address it.  See 
infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
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for any form of public comment.”125  Revenue Rulings provide the IRS’s 
interpretation of how the tax law applies to a particular set of facts.126  In its 
procedural regulations, the IRS provided the following context for Revenue 
Rulings: 
The purpose of publishing revenue rulings and revenue procedures in the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin is to promote correct and uniform application 
of the tax laws by Internal Revenue Service employees and to assist 
taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing 
Service personnel and the public of National Office interpretations of the 
internal revenue laws, related statutes, treaties, regulations, and 
statements of Service procedures affecting the rights and duties of 
taxpayers.127 
Taxpayers generally may rely on Revenue Rulings as guidance regarding the 
application of the tax law to “substantially the same” facts.128   
As discussed below, the IRS not only has the authority under the Code to 
apply Revenue Rulings retroactively, but by statute, Revenue Rulings are 
retroactive unless the IRS specifies otherwise.129  The IRS has explained, 
however, that it generally will not apply Revenue Rulings retroactively where 
to do so would be harmful to taxpayers: “When revenue rulings revoke or 
modify rulings previously published in the Bulletin, the authority of section 
7805(b) ordinarily is invoked to provide that the new rulings will not be 
applied retroactively to the extent that the new rulings have adverse tax 
consequences to taxpayers.”130 
 
125 U.S. Federal Tax Research, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 100, at A-27 (2005) 
[hereinafter BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio]; see also Kornman & Assocs. v. United States, 527 
F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The Government acknowledges that revenue rulings are not 
promulgated pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative 
Procedures [sic] Act.”); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue 
Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 79 (1995) (“The IRS does not 
ordinarily employ notice-and-comment procedures in the publication of Revenue Rulings, 
although occasionally it requests comments on proposed Revenue Rulings.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
126 See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (2010); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814 § 
3.01. 
127 Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii). 
128 Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e). 
129 See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(7) (2006).  The IRS has described this authority as follows: 
Section 7805(b) provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe the extent to 
which any ruling is to be applied without retroactive effect.  That authority has been 
delegated to the Commissioner and has been redelegated to the Associate Chief 
Counsel (Technical), the Associate Chief Counsel (International), and the Assistant 
Commissioner (Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations) and to each of their 
deputies.  The exercise of this authority requires an affirmative action. 
Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814 § 7.01(3). 
130 Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814 § 7.01(3) (emphasis added). 
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How much deference courts accord Revenue Rulings is not entirely clear.131  
The Department of Justice had argued in appellate litigation that Revenue 
Rulings should receive Chevron deference, but it has abandoned that view after 
Mayo.132  By contrast, the Tax Court had stated that “[a]bsent exceptional 
circumstances, revenue rulings are viewed as ‘merely an opinion of a lawyer in 
the agency’, they are not considered to have the effect of law, and they are not 
binding on the Commissioner or the courts.”133  That statement predates both 
Mead134 and an IRS notice that provides that the IRS will follow its own 
published guidance, including Revenue Rulings.135  More recently, the Tax 
Court has applied Skidmore deference in light of Mead.136 
Mead’s approach does suggest that Skidmore deference is appropriate for 
Revenue Rulings:  
In Mead, the Supreme Court concluded that tariff classification rulings do 
not qualify for Chevron-style deference, but that Skidmore factors should 
be applied to determine if some lower level of deference is due.  Although 
 
131 See BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio, supra note 125, No. 100, at A-28 (“It is not entirely 
clear . . . the extent to which revenue rulings may be persuasive authority; in other words, it 
is not clear whether and to what extent courts will defer to the Service’s interpretation of the 
law as stated in a revenue ruling.”). 
132 See Marie Sapirie, DOJ Won’t Argue for Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings and 
Procedures, Official Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 16, 2011, LEXIS, 2011 TNT 90-7 
(“The Department of Justice will no longer argue for Chevron deference for revenue rulings 
and revenue procedures, said Gilbert Rothenberg, appellate section chief in the DOJ’s Tax 
Division.”). 
133 Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 42, 45 (1996) (quoting Stubbs, 
Overbeck & Assocs. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
134 Mead was decided in 2001.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 
(2001).  Professor Ellen Aprill explained, “Mead’s invocation of Skidmore for tariff 
rulings . . . seems to undermine the Tax Court’s attitude toward revenue rulings, and Mead 
has in fact begun to influence the Tax Court’s attitude toward revenue rulings.”  Ellen P. 
Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2109 (2005). 
135 See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003), available at LEXIS, 
2003 TNT 93-7 (stating that, in Tax Court and in “defense or suit letters sent to the 
Department of Justice . . . [,] Chief Counsel attorneys may not argue contrary to final 
guidance,” including Revenue Rulings).  The Chief Counsel Notice further states, “Chief 
Counsel attorneys may not rely on case law to take a position that is less favorable to the 
taxpayer in a particular case than the position set forth in published guidance.”  Id. 
(underline omitted). 
136 See Taproot Admin. Servs. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 202, 208-09 (2009) (stating that 
“[w]e are not bound by revenue rulings” and that Skidmore deference is the appropriate 
standard); PSB Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 131, 144 (2007) (discussing Mead and 
stating, “We conclude that we must evaluate the revenue ruling at hand under the ‘power to 
persuade’ standard set forth in Skidmore.”); Bogue v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 41 
(2011) (“We are not bound by revenue rulings, and we evaluate them based on the ‘power to 
persuade’ standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. . . .”). 
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the case involved tariff classification rulings, the Court defined the issue 
before it more generically: “to consider the limits of Chevron deference 
owed to administrative practice in applying a statute.”  In addition, tariff 
classification rulings are in many respects analogous to Revenue Rulings.  
Accordingly, the Court’s analytical framework may apply in determining 
the level of deference, if any, that revenue rulings deserve.137 
In line with this approach, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
sensibly stated, “Mead involved a Customs Service tariff ruling, which is 
closely akin to an IRS revenue ruling.  Given that the two types of agency 
rulings are analogous, we are required to apply Mead’s standard of review to 
an IRS revenue ruling.”138  Mayo reinforces that approach because it applied 
Mead in the tax context.139 
Commentators generally support the application of Skidmore to Revenue 
Rulings.140  In 2004, the ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on 
Judicial Deference advocated applying Skidmore to Revenue Rulings, in light 
of Mead.141  Professor Kristin Hickman explained, “Since the Court’s decision 
in Mead, most courts and commentators have assumed or concluded that 
Skidmore provides the appropriate evaluative standard for revenue rulings and, 
to a lesser extent, other . . . guidance as well, although not everyone agrees.”142 
 
137 BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio, supra note 125, No. 100, at A-29 (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001)). 
138 Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit cited Mead and Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 
(2000), in applying Skidmore deference to a Revenue Ruling.  See Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 180-81 (6th Cir. 2003). 
139 Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251, 1260 n.62 
(2011). 
140 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Mead test leads to the result that revenue rulings and procedures 
do not receive Chevron deference. Those forms of guidance are therefore evaluated under 
the Skidmore test instead.”); see also Aprill, supra note 134, at 2108-18, 2123 (“[A] 
consensus is emerging that revenue rulings are entitled to Skidmore deference . . . .”); John 
F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and 
Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 89 (2003) (“Mead teaches that 
‘Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate no 
intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority 
was not invoked . . . .’  Although penalties attach for careless, reckless or intentional 
disregard of a revenue ruling, the Treasury, in promulgating revenue rulings, does not 
invoke its authority to make rules with the force of law. . . .  Revenue rulings, therefore, 
should not be considered candidates for Chevron deference.” (footnotes omitted)); Mitchell 
M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, A New Model for Identifying Basis in Life Insurance Policies: 
Implementation and Deference, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 569, 595 (2006) (“Although the Supreme 
Court has not yet clarified whether Chevron or Skidmore applies to revenue rulings, it is 
very likely that the courts will apply Skidmore rather than Chevron in this context.”). 
141 Salem et al., supra note 112, at 744. 
142 Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 
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Applying Skidmore to Revenue Rulings makes sense because, “[w]hen 
promulgating revenue rulings, the IRS does not invoke its authority to make 
rules with the force of law.  Specifically, the IRS does not claim for revenue 
rulings ‘the force and effect of Treasury Department regulations.’”143  The 
relevant Revenue Procedure states, 
Revenue Rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and 
effect of Treasury Department Regulations (including Treasury 
decisions), but are published to provide precedents to be used in the 
disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that 
purpose.  No published ruling or decision will be relied on, used, or cited, 
by any officer or employee of the Service as a precedent in the disposition 
of other cases.144 
The IRS also acts consistently with this view in that it typically does not follow 
notice-and-comment procedures for Revenue Rulings.145  Since Revenue 
Rulings appear to lack the force of law,146 Skidmore, not Chevron, is the 
appropriate deference standard under Mead.147 
C. The Gans Proposal 
In a pre-Mayo article, Mitchell Gans proposed – partly because of “the 
government’s direct interest in the outcome of tax litigation and the adversarial 
bias thereby engendered”148 – that tax regulations should receive deference 
only under Skidmore and Revenue Rulings should receive no deference.149  
Gans argued that this approach is supported by the Tax Court’s expertise: 
“[T]o the extent that deference is driven by the concern that courts might 
otherwise undermine the agencies’ expertise-based decisions, deference cannot 
be justified in areas of law when specialized courts are in place.”150 
 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 260 (footnotes omitted).  Hickman cites Tualatin Valley 
Builders Supply, Inc. v. Comm’r, 522 F.3d 937, 945-47 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., 
concurring), regarding an argument in favor of applying Chevron deference to a Revenue 
Procedure, and Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial 
Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2006), as 
advocating National Muffler deference for Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, and IRS 
Notices.  Id. at 260 n.127. 
143 Aeroquip-Vickers, 347 F.3d at 181 (citing Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814). 
144 Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814. 
145 See BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio, supra note 125, No. 100, at A-27. 
146 See Franklin, supra note 30, at 324 (“Agencies may issue nonlegislative rules so long 
as they do not intend their rules to have legal effect, or so long as they do not bind 
themselves or others, or so long as they are merely interpreting existing legal obligations 
rather than creating new ones.”). 
147 See Smith, supra note 139, at 1260-61. 
148 Gans, supra note 26, at 795. 
149 Id. at 792-95. 
150 Id. at 789. 
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Gans accompanies this observation with an argument for a single trial-level 
federal tax court, arguing that it would have the “salutary by-product” of 
reducing forum shopping.151  He considers both the prospect of a specialized 
court of tax appeals and the approach of having the courts of appeals continue 
to hear all of the appeals in tax cases, arguing with respect to the latter,  
[L]imiting the scope of appellate review would be appropriate (otherwise, 
the disparity in expertise produced under current law would continue).  
Such a limitation on the scope of review could be achieved by requiring 
that the lower court’s decision receive deference on questions of law as 
well as fact, making reversal on legal questions appropriate only where 
the ruling is unreasonable.152  
Gans does not cite the unpopular and ill-fated153 Dobson v. Commissioner154 
for this proposition,155 but the standard is very similar.  In Dobson, the 
Supreme Court stated, 
Whatever latitude exists in resolving questions such as those of proper 
accounting, treating a series of transactions as one for tax purposes, or 
treating apparently separate ones as single in their tax consequences, 
exists in the Tax Court and not in the regular courts; when the court 
cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut 
mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand. . . .  In deciding 
law questions courts may properly attach weight to the decision of points 
of law by an administrative body having special competence to deal with 
the subject matter.  The Tax Court is informed by experience and kept 
current with tax evolution and needs by the volume and variety of its 
work.  While its decisions may not be binding precedents for courts 
dealing with similar problems, uniform administration would be 
promoted by conforming to them where possible.156 
 
151 See id. at 789-90. 
152 Id. at 790 (emphasis added). 
153 See David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 
49 TAX LAW. 629, 631 (1996) (“History has not been kind to the Dobson decision.  It was 
legislatively modified, or, depending on one’s point of view, overruled in 1948 when 
Congress adopted the predecessor to section 7482(a), amending the statute to provide that 
Tax Court decisions shall be reviewed in the same manner and to the same extent as 
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” (footnote omitted)). 
154 320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
155 See Gans, supra note 26, at 790 n.303.  Gans states, 
This limitation appears somewhat novel, but Congress adopted the limitation in the 
context of habeas corpus.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) 
(interpreting the new criminal statutes’ requirement that relief only be granted if the 
decision invalidated “an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal 
law . . .”). 
Id. 
156 Dobson, 320 U.S. at 501-02 (emphasis added). 
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At the time of the Dobson decision, the Tax Court was still an 
administrative agency; it did not become an Article I court until 1969.157  It 
nonetheless had only judicial functions.  Contemporary critique of the Dobson 
rule reflected the difficulty in imposing “the administrative functions 
apparently contemplated by the Dobson decision” on a judicial body.158  
Dobson not only was criticized by contemporary commentators,159 but it 
also was unpopular with appellate courts, which generally preferred to retain a 
larger scope of review. 160  A return to the Dobson regime would also treat tax 
cases differently from other cases.  As the Supreme Court recently observed, 
there is virtue in treating tax cases like other cases.161  Doing so benefits from 
advancements in other areas of law, which is a more efficient approach to law 
development.  As Paul Caron argued, 
A symbiotic relationship between tax and nontax law will deepen our tax 
understanding while providing a fertile area in which to test and refine 
nontax principles. . . .  By replacing their narrow tax lens with a 
panoramic perspective of the legal landscape, the tax debate will be 
invigorated with nontax learning while the special talents of tax lawyers 
and professors will generate insights useful to their nontax 
counterparts.162 
For all of these reasons, privileging the Tax Court’s expertise and providing 
little or no deference to Treasury and IRS rules would be going too far.  The 
IRS, not the Tax Court, is the expert agency.  The Tax Court is a judicial body 
 
157 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730; see also 
I.R.C. § 7441 (2006). 
158 Eisenstein, supra note 51, at 541-42 (“[T]he Tax Court, like other judicial bodies, 
may make a bad condition worse. . . .  It is completely saturated with the weaknesses and 
vagaries of the judicial process.”). 
159 See Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why 
Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 
235, 249 (1998) (“Dobson quickly proved unpopular.  Many circuit court of appeals 
decisions applied Dobson, but unenthusiastically, and leading commentators criticized it.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Eisenstein, supra note 51, at 540 (“The Dobson decision is 
essentially a reaction against the failure of administration by the Treasury, which could have 
narrowed the area of judicial intervention.  Nevertheless, the Dobson case is not the answer 
to the Supreme Court’s prayer.”). 
160 Johnson, supra note 159, at 273. 
161 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 
(2011) (“In the absence of . . . justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.  To the contrary, we have expressly 
‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of 
administrative action.’” (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))). 
162 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax 
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 590 (1994). 
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with only judicial functions.163  Treasury regulations and published IRS rulings 
therefore should continue to receive deference from courts.  The question is 
what level of deference is appropriate. 
Moreover, consistency with other areas of law is beneficial both for tax law 
and for other areas of law that might learn from developments in the tax 
context.  Chevron deference should therefore be the appropriate standard for 
legislative rules, and Skidmore for interpretative rules.  Under Mayo, Treasury 
regulations that are valid under the APA should receive Chevron deference, 
regardless of whether they were promulgated under section 7805 or another 
Code provision.164  Revenue Rulings, by contrast, should receive consideration 
under Skidmore in accordance with Mead and Mayo.165 
III. “FIGHTING” TAX RULINGS 
The discussion above focused on the general context of prospective 
guidance by the federal government.  The government, however, is also a party 
to every federal tax case, whether it arises as a tax deficiency or tax refund 
matter.166  Should the deference standard differ if the Treasury Department or 
IRS issues government-favorable guidance on an issue in litigation?  This Part 
examines that question. 
A. A Typology of Advocacy-Oriented Rulings 
There are several ways in which the Treasury Department can use its rulings 
power to try to influence litigation.  One way is that, after losing one or more 
 
163 As a court, the Tax Court lacks the policymaking power and presidential control 
agencies have.  Presidential control is one justification for Chevron deference. See Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 
1764 (2007) (“Administrative law reflects the presidential control model by increasing 
judicial deference to agency decisions.  The most prominent example is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.  In that case, the Court held that agencies are 
entitled to judicial deference for interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions in large 
part because they are subject to presidential control . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1722, 1727-28 (2011) (“[A]gencies are answerable to the elected President, giving 
them a heightened claim of discretionary authority when it comes to policymaking.”). 
164 See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714. 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 140-142. 
166 In the Tax Court, IRS attorneys represent the government, whereas in the Article III 
courts, Department of Justice Tax Division attorneys do so.  See I.R.C. § 7452 (2006) (“The 
Secretary shall be represented by the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service or his 
delegate in the same manner before the Tax Court as he has heretofore been represented in 
proceedings before such Court.”); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized 
by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a 
party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the 
Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”). 
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cases, it can try to position itself for a different outcome in the future by 
issuing a ruling in its favor.167  In this way, Treasury may be able to “reverse” 
even the Supreme Court.168  The Court stated in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, “A court’s prior 
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves 
no room for agency discretion.”169   
The government may also attempt to use its rulemaking power to influence 
the outcome of pending litigation, which is the primary focus of this Part of the 
Article.  One way the government can do that is by trying to convince the 
Supreme Court not to grant certiorari in a case, so as to leave a court of appeals 
decision undisturbed.  The government took that approach in William L. 
Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner170: 
 
167 See Gans, supra note 26, at 791 (“[S]ubject to the proviso that the Treasury make any 
new regulation prospective, it remains free in many instances to rewrite the outcome of a 
decision it loses, as it did in the aftermath of defeat in Simpson [v. United States, 183 F.3d 
812 (8th Cir. 1999)] and [Estate of] Hubert [v. Comm’r, 520 U.S. 93 (1997)].”). 
168 See id. at 752-53 (“Although permitting an agency to replace the Court’s 
interpretation of a statute with its own contrary interpretation is novel and inconsistent with 
the traditional role of the judiciary, Chevron’s preference for agency resolution of statutory 
ambiguity does lead in this direction.” (footnote omitted)); Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury 
Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 188 (2004) (observing, prior to Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), that “[i]t has 
been increasingly common for the Treasury to attempt to ‘fix’ a Supreme Court 
interpretation that, for various reasons, the Treasury finds problematic.”).  But cf. Brand X, 
545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Brand X principle “would not 
necessarily be applicable to a decision by this Court that would presumably remove any pre-
existing ambiguity”); id. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that agency adoption of a 
rule inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s view on the best interpretation of a statute is “not 
only bizarre.  It is probably unconstitutional.”).  In the oral argument in Home Concrete, 
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, “We’ve never said an agency can change what we’ve said 
the law means.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC, No. 11-139 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-139.pdf. 
169 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982; see also Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-13 (“[W]e have found it 
immaterial to our analysis that a ‘regulation was prompted by litigation.’  Indeed, in United 
Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 . . . (2001), we expressly 
invited the Treasury Department to ‘amend its regulations’ if troubled by the consequences 
of our resolution of the case.” (citation omitted)). 
170 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom., Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181 (2008).  
One commentator described the government’s approach in this case as follows: “[T]he 
Justice Department took the remarkable position that the Court should deny a taxpayer’s 
petition for certiorari on the basis of a regulation that the Treasury Department had not yet 
promulgated or even proposed.”  Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A 
Reconsideration in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 
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[The] conflict [in the circuits] . . . does not require resolution by this 
Court because it is likely to be resolved by new regulations interpreting 
Section 67(e)(1). . . . 
. . . . 
A regulation interpreting Section 67(e)(1) would resolve the conflict 
among the courts of appeals without the need for this Court’s 
intervention. . . .  Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), a court would be required to defer to the agency’s reasonable 
interpretation.171 
Despite the government’s argument, the Court did grant certiorari in that 
case.172  The Treasury also went ahead and issued the regulation.173  The 
Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument to follow the regulation174: 
“The Government did not advance this argument before the Court of Appeals.  
In fact, the notice of proposed rulemaking appears to be the first time the 
Government has ever taken this position, and we are the first Court to which 
the argument has been made in a brief.”175 
A more obvious way the Treasury or IRS can try to influence pending 
litigation – or even a case under audit – is by issuing a regulation or other rule 
addressing the substantive issue in litigation and claiming that the rule resolves 
the issue.  That is what happened in the R.J. Reynolds case.176  Cases such as 
R.J. Reynolds generally involve retroactivity, since the underlying transaction 
will have occurred years before the matter reached the court.177  
 
61 TAX LAW. 481, 482 (2008). 
171 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 5-6, Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181 
(2008) (No. 06-1286), 2007 WL 1520971 at *5-6, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 120-22. 
172 Knight v. Comm’r, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007). 
173 Knight, 552 U.S. at 187 n.3. 
174 Id. at 187-88 (“In applying the statute, the Court of Appeals below asked whether the 
cost at issue could have been incurred by an individual.  This approach flies in the face of 
the statutory language.” (footnote omitted)). 
175 Id. at 187 n.3 (citation omitted). 
176 Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939). 
177 Tax returns are typically due months after the close of the tax year in question.  See 
I.R.C. § 6072(a) (2006) (stating that for individuals, “returns made on the basis of the 
calendar year shall be filed on or before the 15th day of April following the close of the 
calendar year”); id. § 6072(b) (“Returns of corporations under section 6012 made on the 
basis of the calendar year shall be filed on or before the 15th day of March following the 
close of the calendar year.”).  Audits generally occur after the tax year has closed.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 601.103(b) (2010) (“After the returns are filed and processed in internal 
revenue service centers, some returns are selected for examination.”).  The government 
typically has three years from when the return was filed to notify the taxpayer of a 
deficiency.  See I.R.C. § 6501(a).  The IRS can issue other forms of guidance, such as 
Announcements, Notices, and Chief Counsel Advice, but those forms of guidance generally 
do not carry as much weight as regulations or Revenue Rulings.  See Hickman, supra note 
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Until 1996, all Treasury regulations had a presumption of retroactivity; 
section 7805 read, “The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which 
any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied 
without retroactive effect.”178  The current version of the statute179 provides 
that the Treasury generally has the power to make regulations retroactive 
essentially only to the date the Treasury first notified the public about the 
expected contents of the regulation,180 unless the regulation is issued within 
eighteen months of the enactment of the statute.181   
With respect to Revenue Rulings, current law provides, “The Secretary may 
prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling (including any judicial 
decision or any administrative determination other than by regulation) relating 
to the internal revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect.”182  
Thus, the statute retains a presumption of retroactivity for Revenue Rulings. 
The government can also issue a procedural ruling that is not retroactive but 
nonetheless affects the outcome of the case by changing the playing field in 
some way.  An example of this is an attempt to extend the statute of 
limitations, such as in the line of cases that includes Home Concrete & Supply, 
LLC v. United States,183 discussed below,184 although the issue in those cases 
also involves an element of retroactivity because of the content of that 
regulation’s effective date provision.  
B. Courts’ Treatments of Fighting Regulations and Rulings 
There are quite a number of litigated tax cases involving fighting regulations 
and rulings.  The cases take differing approaches and adopt diverse rationales.  
 
142, at 240-41; cf. I.R.C. 6110(b)(1)(A), (k)(3). 
178 See I.R.C. § 7805(b), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101, 110 Stat. 1452, 1468-
69 (1996). 
179 I.R.C. § 7805(b).  The effective date provision states that it applies “with respect to 
regulations which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.”  Id. § 7805 note.  Taxpayer’s counsel in United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply recently argued to the Supreme Court that “enacted” modifies “regulations.” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, No. 
11-139 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/11-139.pdf (“[W]e think, in context, it must modify ‘regulation’ 
because there’s two types of IRS regulations: regulations relating to statutes and regulations 
relating to internal IRS practices.”); see also Brief of American College of Tax Counsel as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 
No. 11-139, at 13 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2011), available at LEXIS, 2011 TNT 248-17 (arguing that 
the language of the effective date provision is ambiguous as  to whether “enacted” modifies 
“regulations” or “statutory provisions.”). 
180 See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1). 
181 Id. § 7805(b)(2). 
182 Id. § 7805(b)(8). 
183 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011). 
184 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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This section first discusses cases involving Treasury regulations – final and 
temporary – then cases involving Revenue Rulings. 
1. Final Treasury Regulations 
The “fighting regs” cases generally reflect a trend moving from concern 
about regulations promulgated during litigation to deference to them after 
Chevron.  Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. is an early pre-Chevron 
decision in which the Court manifested serious discomfort with regulations 
promulgated during related litigation.  In that case, the corporate taxpayer 
periodically purchased its own stock and resold it.185  During litigation on other 
issues in the Board of Tax Appeals relating to the taxpayer’s 1929 taxable 
year, the IRS filed an amended answer asserting that the taxpayer needed to 
report gain on the sale of the stock.186  In 1929, the relevant Treasury 
regulation had provided in part, “‘A corporation realizes no gain or loss from 
the purchase or sale of its own stock.’”187  On May 2, 1934, however, while the 
taxpayer’s case was pending before the Board of Tax Appeals,188 the 
government amended the regulation to state, “‘[W]here a corporation deals in 
its own shares as it might in the shares of another corporation, the resulting 
gain or loss is to be computed in the same manner as though the corporation 
were dealing in the shares of another.’”189  The IRS relied on the amended 
regulation, which was promulgated under the general authority provision of the 
Code.190  Stanley Surrey described this case as “suggest[ing] the dream-like 
details of a law school examination problem.”191 
In R.J. Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer’s “tax liability 
for the year 1929 is to be determined in conformity to the regulation then in 
force.”192  The Court reasoned that Congress had implicitly sanctioned the 
regulations that existed at the time of the taxpayer’s transaction through its 
reenactment of the statute defining gross income.193  The Court did not decide 
whether the reenactment of that section in 1936 and 1938 – after the regulation 
 
185 Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 112 (1939). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 113 (quoting Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 66 (1928)). 
188 Surrey, supra note 39, at 556-57. 
189 R.J. Reynolds, 306 U.S. at 112-13 (quoting T.D. 4430, 13-1 C.B. 36 (1934)). 
190 See id. at 113 (“Section 62 directs the Commissioner, ‘with the approval of the 
Secretary’ of the Treasury, to ‘prescribe and publish all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of this title.’”); cf. Surrey, supra note 39, at 558 (“That the interpretative 
Regulations issued under Section 62 do not possess the vital current of legislative power is 
evidenced by the fact that in other selected sections of the various acts the Commissioner is 
given specific authority to issue rules and regulations . . . .”). 
191 Surrey, supra note 39, at 556. 
192 R.J. Reynolds, 306 U.S. at 116. 
193 Id. 
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was amended – permitted the Treasury to apply the amended regulation, 
stating,  
[W]e have no occasion to decide this question since we are of opinion 
that the reenactment of the section, without more, does not amount to 
sanction of retroactive enforcement of the amendment, in the teeth of the 
former regulation which received Congressional approval, by the passage 
of successive Revenue Acts including that of 1928.194   
Thus, the Court found that the legislative reenactment doctrine prohibited 
the Treasury from amending its regulation retroactively to impose tax liability 
on the taxpayer.  The Court, however, minimized the importance of the 
doctrine shortly after the R.J. Reynolds decision.195  Still, R.J. Reynolds reflects 
judicial discomfort with retroactive application of a regulation amended during 
litigation.196 
More recently, but prior to Chevron, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit considered whether a regulation finalized in 1968 but retroactive to 
1954 applied to a 1962 transaction.197  Applying the then-current version of 
Code section 7805(b), the Second Circuit stated, “We recognize that subject to 
certain limitations the Commissioner is empowered to prescribe the extent, if 
any, to which his regulations shall be given retroactive effect.”198  The court 
stated that “the Commissioner may not take advantage of his power to 
promulgate retroactive regulations during the course of a litigation for the 
purpose of providing himself with a defense based on the presumption of 
validity accorded to such regulations.”199  It concluded, however, that even 
under the regulation that existed at the time of the taxpayer’s transaction, the 
IRS had the better argument,200 rendering its statement dictum. 
The year before Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court mentioned in a 
footnote in the famous case of Commissioner v. Tufts that the applicable 
regulation had been promulgated while the case was on appeal but found that it 
“merely formalized the Commissioner’s prior interpretation.” 201  Accordingly, 
 
194 Id. at 117. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 51-54. 
196 The regulation at issue in R.J. Reynolds was amended partly in response to a court of 
appeals decision finding sales of a corporation’s own shares taxable.  Surrey, supra note 39, 
at 556 (citing Comm’r v. S.A. Woods Machine Co., 57 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1932)). 
197 See Chock Full O’ Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971). 
198 Id. at 302. 
199 Id. at 303; see also id. at 302 n.6 (“[C]ourts have declined to give retroactive effect to 
regulations or rulings of the Commissioner . . . when litigation involving the area clarified 
by the regulation had already been begun, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Goodwyn 
Crockery Co., 315 F.2d 110, 113 (6th Cir. 1963) . . . .”). 
200 Id. 
201 Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 n.9 (1983).  The author thanks Deborah Geier for 
pointing this out. 
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the Court found that the IRS’s approach “implement[ed] the statutory mandate 
in a reasonable manner” under National Muffler.202 
The Court’s approach in Tufts suggests that a regulation promulgated even 
late in litigation deserves the same deference it would otherwise receive, at 
least if it does not reflect an about-face, as in R.J. Reynolds.  And more recent 
Supreme Court decisions have not contained even that caveat.  
After Chevron, but before the recent decision in Mayo,203 the leading case 
on the effect of issuing a regulation in response to litigation was a 1996 
Supreme Court case, Smiley v. Citibank204 – a non-tax case involving a 
regulation issued with notice and comment by the Comptroller of the 
Currency.  The issue in Smiley was whether Chevron deference should 
apply.205  The Court said that it did; that the regulation was issued 100 years 
after the statute was enacted and that the litigation disclosed the need for the 
regulation were irrelevant.206  The plaintiff also argued that the regulation was 
inconsistent with previous positions taken by the Comptroller.207  The Court 
disagreed on the facts but also stated, 
Sudden and unexplained change, . . . or change that does not take account 
of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, . . . may be “arbitrary, 
capricious [or] an abuse of discretion,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  But if these 
pitfalls are avoided, change is not invalidating, since the whole point of 
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute 
with the implementing agency.208 
In Mayo, which involved a regulation promulgated after the government lost 
a previous case against the same party,209 the Court cited Smiley with approval, 
stating in part, “[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a ‘regulation 
 
202 Id. at 317. 
203 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
204 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
205 See id. at 740. 
206 Id. at 740-41; see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002) (“Walton also 
asks us to disregard the [Social Security] Agency’s interpretation of its formal regulations 
on the ground that the Agency only recently enacted those regulations, perhaps in response 
to this litigation. We have previously rejected similar arguments.” (citing Smiley v. Citibank 
(S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996))).  In Smiley, the agency that had promulgated the 
regulation was not a party to the litigation.  See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 737; id. at 740 
(referencing “this and similar litigation in which the Comptroller has participated as amicus 
curiae on the side of the banks.”).  In Barnhart, however, the suit was against Jo Anne 
Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the agency that had promulgated the regulation. 
See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 212. 
207 See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742. 
208 Id. 
209 Mayo Found. v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167, 1167 n.1 (D. Minn. 
2007), rev’d, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (citing United States 
v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 282 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003)). 
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was prompted by litigation.’”210  Thus, the balance seems to have shifted after 
Chevron toward deferring to regulations even if they were issued during 
related litigation. 
2. The Controversy over Temporary Regulations 
In most cases in which a regulation benefits from Chevron deference, the 
agency will have followed the notice-and-comment procedures under the APA, 
as the agencies did in both Smiley and Mayo.211  But the notice-and-comment 
process takes time.  Treasury could issue proposed regulations, but they may 
not have the force of law212 and thus should not benefit from Chevron 
deference.213   
The Treasury has a way around this problem, however.  It often issues 
temporary regulations simultaneously with proposed regulations.  Temporary 
regulations generally have similar legal force to final regulations – until they 
expire.214  Accordingly, by issuing temporary regulations, instead of a Revenue 
 
210 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712 (2011) 
(quoting Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740). 
211 As discussed above in notes 99-111 and accompanying text, Mead stated, 
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the 
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending 
to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such 
force.  Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have 
reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  
Mead left open the possibility that a rule could have the force of law without notice and 
comment: “[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the 
want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons 
for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none 
was afforded.”  Id. at 230-31 (citations omitted). 
212 See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003), available at LEXIS, 
2003 TNT 93-7 (“Proposed regulations have no legal effect unless and until they are 
adopted.”).  In 1997, the Tax Court stated, “proposed regulations and revenue rulings are 
generally not afforded any more weight than that of a position advanced by the 
Commissioner on brief.  That is especially true here, where respondent [the Commissioner] 
did not publish her position prior to this controversy.”  Gen. Dynamics Corp. & Subsidiaries 
v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 107, 120-21 (1997) (citations omitted). 
213 See Tax & Accounting Software Corp. v. United States, 301 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (applying Skidmore deference under Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 
(2000), because “the government’s interpretation . . . had not been incorporated into a final 
regulation that had gone through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process”); see also 
Sapirie, supra note 132 (“Speaking at the Low-Income Taxpayer session of the American 
Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting in Washington on May 7, [Gilbert] 
Rothenberg said the [Department of Justice] was prepared to argue that temporary 
regulations are entitled to Chevron deference, but that it wouldn’t argue that proposed 
regulations should also be accorded deference.”). 
214 See Hickman, supra note 102, at 1158-59 (“Congress, Treasury, and taxpayers all 
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Ruling or another type of guidance, the temporary regulations might obtain 
Chevron deference.215  There currently is no definitive authority on whether 
post-promulgation comment is sufficient, and if it is not, whether that would 
invalidate the final regulations, too.216   
A recent line of cases that includes Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United 
States,217 in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, illustrates the IRS 
strategy.218  These cases arise out of the “Son of BOSS” tax shelter219 and 
involve a procedural issue: the statute of limitations on assessment of tax. 
Although the general limitations period is three years,220 Code section 
6501(e) provides for a special six-year limitation period where “the taxpayer 
omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein and . . . such 
amount is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the 
return.”221  The rationale for this provision, as articulated by the Supreme 
Court in 1958 in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner,222 is that “where, because of a 
 
operate with the understanding that Treasury regulations, whether temporary or final, are 
legally binding on both taxpayers and the government.”); Salem et al., supra note 112, at 
735 (“Unlike proposed regulations, temporary regulations are effective when they initially 
appear in the Federal Register, thus providing immediate and binding guidance to 
taxpayers.”). 
215 See Hickman, supra note 7, at 1558.  Hickman explains, 
Robinson [v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 44, 66-67 (2002)] actually called into question the 
validity of certain temporary Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to the general 
authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000) but without the benefit of public notice and 
comment.  Whether temporary regulations so issued are generally entitled to Chevron 
deference remains an open question.  Regardless, for purposes of its evaluation, the 
Tax Court in Robinson expressly equated temporary regulations with other 
interpretative regulations adopted pursuant to § 7805(a).  See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 67. 
Id. at 1558 n.98 (citations omitted). 
216 See Hickman, supra note 102, at 1191-92 (discussing an array of approaches to this 
issue in non-tax cases); see also Asimow, supra note 113, at 369 (“[F]inal rules that 
supersede temporary regulations are . . . jeopardized because courts might treat the notice 
and comment procedure provided after adoption of a temporary regulation as insufficient.”). 
217 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011). 
218 See id. at 255-56. 
219 See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Our holding is 
consistent with other courts’ analysis regarding the applicability of Colony in the context of 
Son of BOSS tax shelters.” (citing Intermountain and other cases)).  Burks explained, 
In a Son of BOSS scheme, partners engage in various long and short sale transactions 
and transfer the resulting obligations to the partnership thereby improperly inflating the 
basis in the partnership assets. . . .  When basis is overstated, “gross income is affected 
to the same degree as when a gross-receipt item of the same amount is completely 
omitted from a tax return.” 
Id. at 349 (citations omitted) (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958)). 
220 I.R.C. § 6501(a) (West 2011). 
221 Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A). 
222 357 U.S. 28 (1958). 
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taxpayer’s omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a 
special disadvantage in detecting errors[,] . . . the return on its face provides no 
clue to the existence of the omitted item.”223  Colony involved an 
overstatement of tax basis in subdivided lots,224 about which the Court stated, 
“[W]hen, as here, the understatement of a tax arises from an error in reporting 
an item disclosed on the face of the return the Commissioner is at no such 
disadvantage.”225  Accordingly it found that the extended statutory period did 
not apply.226 
The transaction in Colony predated section 6501(e),227 but that section had 
been enacted before the case reached the Court.  The Court noted in dicta, 
“[W]e observe that the conclusion we reach is in harmony with the 
unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A).”228  Section 6501(e)(1)(A) states in 
part,  
In the case of a trade or business, the term ‘gross income’ means the total 
of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if 
such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution 
by the cost of such sales or services . . . .229   
The IRS has interpreted that language to mean that in cases not involving the 
goods or services of a trade or business, “gross income is determined after 
reducing sales proceeds by basis,”230 which results in an omission from gross 
income where a business sold non-trade or business property with an inflated 
basis.  
Prior to promulgating new regulations, the IRS pressed that argument but 
lost in two courts of appeals, which applied Colony.231  In Salman Ranch Ltd. 
v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reasoned in part, 
 
223 Id. at 36. 
224 Id. at 30. 
225 Id. at 36.  This interpretation of the statute is supported by the definition in section 
6501 of the amount omitted; it provides an exception for disclosed items.  See I.R.C. 
§ 6501(e)(1)(B)(ii); see also Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, Limitation by 
Regulation: Heads the Service Wins, Tails Taxpayer Loses?, 30 ABA SEC. OF TAX’N 
NEWSQUARTERLY 7, 7-8 (2010). 
226 Colony, 357 U.S. at 38. 
227 See id. at 37. 
228 Id. 
229 I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) (West 2011). 
230 I.R.S. Chief Counsel Memo. 200537029 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at LEXIS, 2005 
TNT 180-36. 
231 Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 2009); cf. Beard v. 
Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2011) (not applying Colony but stating, 
“[A]pplying standard rules of statutory construction to give equal weight to each term and 
avoid rendering parts of the language superfluous, we find that a plain reading of Section 
6501(e)(1)(A) would include an inflation of basis as an omission of gross income in non-
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We acknowledge that Congress did not have before it Colony, a 1958 
decision, when it enacted § 6501(e)(1)(A) in 1954.  Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that Colony represents an interpretation of the very same 
language that is now found in § 6501(e)(1)(A), and in the years since 
Colony, Congress has not indicated that the Court’s interpretation of the 
language of § 275(c) should not apply to § 6501(e)(1)(A).232 
In Bakersfield Energy Partners, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
similarly concluded, “However sensible the IRS’s argument may be that a 
taxpayer can ‘omit . . . an amount’ of gain by overstating its basis, this 
argument is foreclosed by Colony.” 233  Thus, the Ninth Circuit found Colony 
binding precedent. 234  The court also stated, however, that, under the Brand X 
case, “[t]he IRS may have the authority to promulgate a reasonable 
reinterpretation of an ambiguous provision of the tax code, even if its 
interpretation runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s ‘opinion as to the best 
reading’ of the provision.” 235 
Perhaps accepting the Ninth Circuit’s invitation to promulgate a new 
interpretation of section 6501(e), on September 24, 2009, the Treasury 
Department issued proposed and temporary regulations, maintaining the 
government’s position both with respect to the general six-year period and with 
respect to partnership items,236 which has an analogue to section 6501(e) in 
section 6229(c)(2).237  The regulations provided in part that in the non-trade or 
 
trade or business situations.” (citations omitted)). 
232 Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1373. 
233 Bakersfield Energy Partners, 568 F.3d at 778. 
234 Id. (“The IRS may have the authority to promulgate a reasonable reinterpretation of 
an ambiguous provision of the tax code, even if its interpretation runs contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s ‘opinion as to the best reading’ of the provision. . . .  We do not.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005))). 
235 Id. (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83). 
236 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2)-1T (Sept. 28, 2009); Temp. Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6501(e)-1T (Sept. 28, 2009); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2)-1, 74 Fed. Reg. 
49,354, 49,355 (Sept. 28, 2009); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,354, 
49,355 (Sept. 28, 2009); T.D. 9511, 75 Fed. Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. Pt. 301) (enacting proposed regulations and removing temporary regulations); 
see also Mark Allison, The New Battle in an Old War: Omissions from Gross Income, 2010 
TAX NOTES TODAY 45-4, 1227, 1239 (Mar. 9, 2010) (“[A]ccording to Treasury, the new 
regulations merely clarify the government’s long-standing interpretation of section 
6501(e)(1)(A)(i) – which Treasury believes was interpreted by the courts as ambiguous – 
and limit the holding in Colony to the trade or business context.”); IRS Publishes Proposed 
Regs on Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 184-11 (Sept. 
25, 2009); IRS Pubilshes [sic] Temporary Regs on Definition of Omission from Gross 
Income, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 184-9 (Sept. 25, 2009). 
237 Section 6229(c) is not identical to section 6501(e), however.  Section 6229(c) 
provides, “If any partnership omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein 
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business context, “an understated amount of gross income resulting from an 
overstatement of unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from 
gross income.”238  
In Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner,239 the 
Tax Court had its first opportunity to consider the temporary regulations 
promulgated under section 6229.  The Tax Court had previously found in that 
case, following its decision in Bakersfield Energy Partners, that a three-year 
period applied to inflated basis issues.240  After the regulations were 
promulgated, the IRS moved for reconsideration of the Intermountain case,241 
which the court granted.242  
Intermountain involved a partnership return filed on September 15, 2000 
and a partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) sent on September 14, 
2006.243  In its second opinion in the case, the Tax Court considered how to 
apply the regulations’ effective date, which provides that they apply to 
“taxable years with respect to which the applicable period for assessing tax did 
not expire before September 24, 2009.”244  The IRS argued, “‘The temporary 
regulations apply to petitioner’s 1999 tax year, because the period of 
limitations under sections 6229(c)(2) and 6501(e)(1)(A), as interpretated [sic] 
in the regulations, remains open with respect to that year.’”245  The IRS thus 
tried to use the regulations themselves to assert their applicability to a case in 
which the statute arguably would otherwise have expired.  
The Tax Court called this “a notably convoluted interpretation of the 
effective/applicability date provisions” and rejected the IRS’s argument.246  It 
 
and such amount is described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 6501(e)(1)(A), subsection (a) 
shall be applied by substituting ‘6 years’ for ‘3 years’.”  I.R.C. § 6229(c)(2) (West 2011).  It 
does not explicitly refer to section 6501(e)(1)(B), which provides special rules for 
determining gross income for purposes of section 6501(e)(1)(A).  I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B). 
238 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2)-1T. 
239 134 T.C. 211 (2010) (reviewed by the court), rev’d, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476 
(D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). 
240 Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 207, 215-16 (2007), aff’d, 568 F.3d 
767 (9th Cir. 2009). 
241 See Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 211-212. 
242 The government’s motion was late but the Tax Court granted it anyway.  Id. at 215.  
In addition, “following the issuance of the regulations, Justice moved for the Federal Circuit 
to reconsider its decision in Salman Ranch based on the new guidance, confirming the 
obvious goal of the regulations.  (The motion was denied, and the reconsideration period in 
Bakersfield Energy had already closed.)”  Allison, supra note 236, at 1239. 
243 Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 212. 
244 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2)-1T(a)(2)(b) (Sept. 28, 2009); see also Temp. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(2)(b) (Sept. 28, 2009). 
245 Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 219 (quoting Respondent’s Brief in Support of Motion to 
Vacate Order and Decision at 6, Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 
211 (2010) (No. 25868-06)). 
246 Id. at 218. 
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explained that to accept the IRS’s argument, it would have to depart from its 
holding in Bakersfield Energy Partners, which had been affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.247  Thus, it refused to accord deference to the 
IRS’s interpretation of the regulations: 
Ordinarily, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling 
unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer 
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) . . . .  Here, however, the Court 
concludes that respondent’s interpretation of the temporary regulations’ 
effective/applicability date provisions is erroneous and inconsistent with 
the regulations.  Specifically, we find the interpretation to be irreparably 
marred by circular, result-driven logic and the wishful notion that the 
temporary regulations should apply to this case because Intermountain 
was involved in what he believes was an abusive tax transaction.248  
The court found instead that “[t]he plain meaning of the temporary regulations’ 
effective/applicability date provisions indicates that the temporary regulations 
do not apply to this case because the applicable period of limitations expired 
before September 24, 2009.”249 
In Intermountain, the Tax Court majority also considered whether the 
regulations would be entitled to deference if they were applicable.250  The court 
did not, however, determine what level of deference to apply.  Instead, it 
applied Brand X, which precludes an agency from interpreting a statute 
differently from a prior court decision if the decision held “that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute.”251  According to the Tax 
Court, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Colony, which found that the extended 
limitations period would only apply “‘where a taxpayer actually omitted some 
income receipt or accrual in his computation of gross income, and not more 
generally to errors in that computation arising from other causes,’”252 
“‘unambiguously foreclose[d] the agency’s interpretation’ of sections 
6229(c)(2) and 6501(e)(1)(A) and displaces respondent’s temporary 
regulations.”253 
Judges Halpern and Holmes concurred in the result, arguing that before 
considering the substantive validity of the regulations, they would “consider 
first the logically prior question of the procedural validity of the temporary 
regulations,” and concluded that the taxpayer “has the better argument.”254  On 
 
247 Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 218-19. 
248 Id. at 219 (footnote omitted). 
249 Id. at 220. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. at 221 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 982 (2005)). 
252 Id. at 224 (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958)). 
253 Id. (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983). 
254 Id. at 227 (Halpern, J., concurring). 
  
684 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:643 
 
that issue, the Halpern-Holmes concurrence explained, “Giving the public the 
opportunity to participate through notice and comment is important in giving 
regulations legitimacy.  Giving the public a chance to comment only after 
making the regulations effective does not comply with the APA.”255 
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
Tax Court’s decision in Intermountain, deferring to the regulations under 
Chevron.256  It gave no weight to the taxpayer’s argument that the government 
had issued retroactive regulations during the course of the litigation, finding 
that fact irrelevant under Smiley and Mayo.257  It also found that the regulations 
were validly promulgated under the APA, despite having been released 
simultaneously in proposed and temporary form.258 
After the Tax Court’s decision in Intermountain, several other courts of 
appeals faced the issue, starting with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Beard v. Commissioner.259  In Beard, the court interpreted the plain 
language of the statute and found Colony inapplicable.260  Because it did not 
apply Colony, it did not reach the issue of what deference to accord the 
temporary regulations.261  In dicta, however, the court stated, 
[W]e would have been inclined to grant the temporary regulation Chevron 
deference . . . .  We have previously given deference to interpretive 
Treasury regulations issued with notice-and-comment procedures, see 
Kikalos v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 190 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 
1999); Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 
979-84 (7th Cir. 1998), and the Supreme Court has stated that the absence 
of notice-and-comment procedures is not dispositive to the finding of 
Chevron deference.  Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 . . . (2002).262 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit would have applied Chevron deference to the 
temporary regulations, despite the lack of prior notice and comment and 
without citing Mayo, which was decided two weeks earlier.263 
 
255 Id. at 246-47 (citations omitted).  The concurrence also stated, “Since the majority has 
chosen to address the effective date of the temporary regulations and their substantive 
validity, we feel compelled to comment.  We are persuaded by neither of the majority’s 
analyses . . . .”  Id. at 227. 
256 Intermountain Ins. Servs. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476, at 
*21 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). 
257 Id. at *37-38. 
258 Id. at *47-48. 
259 633 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. pending, No. 10-1553 (filed 
June 23, 2011). 
260 Id. at 621. 
261 Id. at 623. 
262 Id.  
263 Mayo was decided on January 11, 2011.  See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & 
Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 704 (2011).  Beard was decided on January 26, 
2011.  See Beard, 633 F.3d at 616. 
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Shortly after Beard, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue, in Home 
Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States.264  Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the 
Fourth Circuit found that Colony controlled and foreclosed the argument that 
overstatement of basis constituted an omission from gross income.265  The 
temporary regulation under section 6501 had become final while the appeal 
was pending,266 but the Fourth Circuit found that it did not apply to the years in 
question because the assessment period would have ended, even under the six-
year period of limitations, in 2006, prior to the effective date of the 
regulation.267  The court rejected the IRS’s argument, stated in the preamble to 
the final regulation, that the statute “remain[ed] open for ‘all taxable years . . . 
that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent 
jurisdiction . . . in which a decision had not become final (within the meaning 
of [26 U.S.C. §] 7481)’” as of September 24, 2009,268 finding that argument 
inconsistent with the language of section 6501.269  The Fourth Circuit also 
held, citing Mayo, that even if the regulation applied, Chevron deference is 
only owed when the statute it is interpreting is ambiguous.270  According to the 
court, Colony had found the language of the statute unambiguous.271   
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly found Colony 
controlling, in Burks v. United States.272  It therefore did not need to reach the 
issue of the level of deference due the temporary regulations in order to find 
for the taxpayer.273  It also cited to the final regulations, rather than the 
temporary ones, because “any difference[s] between the Temporary and final 
Regulations are not material to our review.”274  The court found it unclear, 
however, whether the regulations would be entitled to Chevron deference 
under Mayo275:   
In Mayo, the Court held that the principles underlying its decision in 
Chevron “apply with full force in the tax context” and applied Chevron to 
treasury regulations issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).  [Mayo, 131 
S. Ct.] at 707.  Significantly, in Mayo the Supreme Court was not faced 
with a situation where, during the pendency of the suit, the treasury 
 
264 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011). 
265 Id. at 251. 
266 Id. at 255. 
267 Id. at 256. 
268 Id. (quoting T.D. 9511, 2011-1 C.B. 455). 
269 Id. at 256-57. 
270 Id. at 257. 
271 Id.  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Home Concrete. See Grant of 
Certiorari in 11-139, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00139qp.pdf. 
272 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011). 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 359 n.8. 
275 Id. at 360 n.9. 
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promulgated determinative, retroactive regulations following prior 
adverse judicial decisions on the identical legal issue.  “Deference to what 
appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating 
position” is “entirely inappropriate.”  Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 213 . . . (1988).  The Commissioner “may not take 
advantage of his power to promulgate retroactive regulations during the 
course of a litigation for the purpose of providing himself with a defense 
based on the presumption of validity accorded to such regulations.”  
Chock Full O’ Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 
1971).276 
The Fifth Circuit also noted that the temporary regulations had not undergone 
pre-promulgation notice and comment, which might affect the level of 
deference due.277 
Two months after Mayo was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit addressed the issue in Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States.278  It 
found that the regulations were intervening authority allowing it to depart from 
its holding in Salman Ranch.279  Reversing the Court of Federal Claims, the 
court deferred to the final regulations under Chevron.280  The court noted, “In 
its response brief, Grapevine also argues that the temporary Treasury 
regulations should not receive Chevron deference because of purported 
procedural shortcomings in their issuance.  Now that the regulations have 
issued in final form, these arguments are moot.”281  Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which had subsequent tax years involving 
Salman Ranch before it in another post-Mayo case, applied Chevron282:  
Our analysis focuses on the final regulations, which, for our purposes, do 
not differ materially from the temporary regulations.  We do not opine on 
what effect, if any, the temporary regulations would have had if they had 
not been superseded by the final regulations during the pendency of this 
appeal.283 
Thus, the courts of appeals do not agree on an approach to temporary 
regulations issued without notice and comment.  Some courts, at least, are 
willing to accord Chevron deference to such regulations once they have been 
finalized.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Home 
 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
279 Id. at 1375-76, 1383-84. 
280 Id. at 1371. 
281 Id. at 1380. 
282 Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10910, at *17 n.11, *29 (10th 
Cir. May 31, 2011). 
283 Id. at *17 n.11. 
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Concrete, but the questions presented to the Court do not explicitly raise this 
issue.284 
3. Revenue Rulings 
The courts have taken differing approaches to an IRS argument that a 
Revenue Ruling issued during the pendency of the litigation should apply to 
the case in issue.  This may not be surprising given the lack of definitive 
guidance on the level of deference courts should accord Revenue Rulings 
generally. 
Some of the cases emphasize the importance of consistency with previous 
administrative practice.  For example, in a 1966 U.S. Supreme Court case,285 
the taxpayer, in advance of purchasing a ship, had obtained a letter ruling that 
allowed it to depreciate the ship over a three-year period, “subject to change if 
warranted by subsequent experience.”286  Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal in 
1956 unexpectedly caused the ship’s value to increase significantly.287  The 
taxpayer-corporation sold the ship in 1957, but it also liquidated in that year, 
which, under then-current law, allowed it to avoid capital gain on the sale.288  
The taxpayer also claimed virtually all of the third year’s depreciation 
deduction.289 
The IRS’s position – stated in a Revenue Ruling published the day before 
trial290 – was that “the deduction for depreciation in the year of sale of a 
depreciable asset is limited to the amount by which the adjusted basis of the 
asset at the beginning of the year exceeds the amount realized from the 
sale.”291   
In the opinion by Chief Justice Warren, who wrote for a six-Justice 
majority, the Court proved unsympathetic to the government’s position: 
The Commissioner’s position represents a sudden and unwarranted volte-
face from a consistent administrative and judicial practice followed prior 
to 1962.  The taxpayer has cited a wealth of litigated cases and several 
rulings in which the Commissioner unhesitatingly allowed depreciation in 
the year of favorable sale.  Against this array of authority, the 
 
284 The deference question presented is framed as follows: “Whether a final regulation 
promulgated by the Department of the Treasury, which reflects the IRS’s view that an 
understatement of gross income attributable to an overstatement of basis can trigger the 
extended six-year assessment period, is entitled to judicial deference.”  See Grant of 
Certiorari in 11-139, supra note 271.  Accordingly, it does not refer to the level of deference 
due a temporary regulation. 
285 Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). 
286 Id. at 274. 
287 Id. 
288 See id. 
289 Id. at 275. 
290 Id. at 275 & n.1 (citing Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 C.B. 29). 
291 Id. at 275-76. 
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Commissioner contends that he did not “focus” on the issue in most of 
these instances.  This is hardly a persuasive response . . . .  Moreover, in 
several instances, the Commissioner did not merely consent to 
depreciation in the year of sale, but insisted over the taxpayer’s objection 
that it be taken.292 
Thus, the majority focused on the consistency of the IRS’s position prior to the 
ruling promulgated during the litigation.  The dissenters disputed this 
approach, countering that several of the cases and rulings cited in the majority 
opinion were not on point.293 
Niles v. United States, a 1983 Ninth Circuit decision, took a similar 
approach.294  In that case, the taxpayer was injured on a playground when he 
was eleven years old.295  He received negligent medical care that rendered him 
quadriplegic.296  He successfully sued, receiving over $4 million in a lump 
sum.297  The California Court of Appeals affirmed the award.298  During the 
appeal, in order to show that the award was not excessive, the taxpayer’s 
attorney “presented a detailed, hypothetical itemization of the award, allocating 
$1,588,176 to future medical expenses.”299  The taxpayer excluded the award 
from his gross income in accordance with Code section 104(a)(2).300 
The IRS challenged the taxpayer’s deduction of medical expenses,301  
reasoning that if the taxpayer were “allowed to deduct amounts he received in 
 
292 Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  The Court explained that in one 
case, “the taxpayers tried without success to forgo the depreciation deduction for the year of 
sale since the taxes payable on the resulting increase in ordinary income would have been 
less than the increased amount payable under the existing capital gain provision if 
depreciation were taken.”  Id. at 280 n.6 (citing Simons v. Comm’r, 19 B.T.A. 711 (1930)).  
In addition, “[i]n several other cases the Commissioner expressly required a year-of-sale 
depreciation deduction, thus increasing the gain on the sale.”  Id. 
293 Id. at 295-96 (White, J., dissenting).  The dissent stated, 
Several of the cases and revenue rulings relied upon by the majority to establish past 
practice were concerned with tax years previous to 1922, when the first capital gain 
provision became applicable.  I would not give precedential significance to positions 
taken during that time because the tax saving resulting from a depreciation deduction in 
the year of sale would have been exactly offset by the tax liability resulting from the 
correspondingly greater gain upon the sale of the asset due to the lower basis.  The 
remaining revenue ruling and most of the remaining cases relied upon by the majority 
were concerned primarily with issues other than the one now before us. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
294 710 F.2d 1391, 1393 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983). 
295 Id. at 1392. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
298 Id.; see Niles v. City of San Rafael, 116 Cal. 733 (1974). 
299 Niles, 710 F.2d at 1392. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. (stating that “the IRS asserted income tax deficiencies against [the taxpayer] for 
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a personal injury award that were intended as compensation for future medical 
expenses, he would be getting an exclusion and a deduction for the same 
monies.”302  Furthermore, the IRS, adopting the hypothetical itemization of the 
award that the taxpayer presented in state court, determined that the taxpayer 
could not “deduct any future medical expenses until the aggregate amount of 
such expenses exceed[ed] $1,588,176.”303 
The district court granted summary judgment for the taxpayer.304  In 
affirming, the court of appeals noted the absence of any authority supporting 
the IRS’s decision to make an allocation.305  The court therefore considered 
whether allocation was “unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with the . . . 
Code.”306   
The court noted, “Revenue Ruling 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 120, specifically 
addresses the issue in this case and concludes that although the jury did not 
allocate a specific amount for future medical expenses, an allocable amount 
may be determined based on the best evidence available under the 
circumstances.”307  The court refused, however, to rely on the ruling: “We do 
not rely on or pass judgment on the propriety of [the Revenue Ruling] since it 
was promulgated during the audit, and was based on the facts of the instant 
case.  As the district court noted, we cannot allow the IRS to take advantage of 
a self-serving ruling.”308 
The court also found that the 1979 ruling was inconsistent with previous 
administrative practice: 
In attempting to allocate a portion of [the taxpayer’s] lump-sum jury 
award to future medical expenses, the Government is changing an 
administrative practice almost as old as the income tax itself.  It was in 
1922 that the Government declared it would not make allocation from 
lump-sum verdicts. 
. . . . 
This court does not look favorably upon an administrative change in “a 
principle of taxation so firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence,” 
Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1982), 
particularly when that change is sought by means of adjudication in a 
particular audit.309 
 
the years 1973 through 1976” but “[t]he only deficiency before this court is for medical 
expenses deducted in 1975”). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 1393. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 1393 n.3. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 1393-94. 
  
690 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:643 
 
The court stressed that “by refusing to allow the IRS to deviate from such a 
long-standing and well-understood administrative practice, we are 
presumptively supporting the will of Congress.”310 
A somewhat more recent Tax Court decision focused primarily on what it 
perceived as government opportunism in issuing the ruling.  In that case, the 
taxpayer, a large publicly held corporation, had several lines of business.311  
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, the taxpayer transferred two of its 
business operations to two new wholly owned corporations, Tandy Brands, 
Inc. and Tandycrafts, Inc, and received all of their stock in return.312  The 
transferred assets included assets for which a credit had been taken under Code 
section 38.313 
The issue before the Tax Court was whether Code section 47(a) required the 
taxpayer to recapture a portion of the credit that had been allowed in prior 
years, as a result of the reorganization.314  Initially, there was no authority on 
point.315  The court noted, however, that after the case had been tried and 
briefed, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 89-18.316  In the Revenue Ruling, the 
Commissioner “concluded on almost identical facts that recapture is 
appropriate in the year of the transfer of assets.”317  The court expressed its 
general approach to Revenue Rulings, as well as its specific concern about the 
timing of that Ruling: 
Revenue rulings do not ordinarily constitute authority in this Court, since 
“absent special circumstances, a revenue ruling merely represents the 
Commissioner’s position with respect to a specific factual situation.”  We 
were well aware of respondent’s [the IRS’s] position on this issue before 
the issuance of Rev. Rul. 89-18; we think that the ruling is a thinly veiled 
attempt to influence this litigation, judging from the similarity of the facts 
and the timing of its issuance.  This and other courts have routinely 
looked upon such bootstrapping revenue rulings with disfavor.318 
The court also dismissed the content of the Revenue Ruling: “In any event, 
the ruling contains no cited authority to support the conclusion that recapture is 
required in year one vis-à-vis year two and [the revenue ruling] is 
 
310 Id. at 1395. 
311 Tandy Corp. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1165, 1166 (1989). 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
314 See id. at 1168. 
315 Id. at 1169. 
316 Id. at 1170. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Stark v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 243, 250-51 (1986)) (citing 
Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r, 383 U.S. 272, 279 (1966); Busse v. Comm’r, 479 F.2d 
1147, 1152 n.12 (7th Cir. 1973), aff’g 58 T.C. 389 (1972); Ludwig v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 979, 
986 n.4 (1977)). 
  
2012] THE FIGHT OVER “FIGHTING REGS” 691 
 
unpersuasive.”319  After considering whether the step-transaction doctrine 
applied and concluding that it did not, the court resolved the issue in the 
taxpayer’s favor.320 
A 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, AMP Inc. v. 
United States,321 followed Tandy’s approach, refusing to apply a Revenue 
Ruling issued during litigation.  In AMP, the underlying issue was whether the 
corporate taxpayer was entitled to the foreign tax credit in the amount it 
claimed in an amended return.322  During the 1981 and 1982 taxable years, the 
taxpayer had owned 100 percent of the stock in a Brazilian subsidiary, AMP 
Brasil, from which it had received dividends that it reported.323  It also claimed 
a foreign tax credit for “deemed paid Brazilian taxes.”324 
During the years at issue in this case, the Brazilian economy was 
operating under hyperinflationary conditions which decreased the 
purchasing power of the Brazilian cruzeiro.  In November 1982, Brazil 
adopted Decree Law No. 1967, which established an indexing system for 
the payment of Brazilian income taxes.  The index was based on the value 
of the Brazilian Readjustable National Treasury Bond (Obrigacoes 
Reajustaveis do Tesouro Nacional) (ORTN).  The ORTN’s nominal 
cruzeiro value was adjusted monthly as a function of the fluctuation in the 
purchasing power of the cruzeiro, in effect reflecting a devaluation of the 
cruzeiro resulting from inflation. . . .  AMP’s tax payments were required 
to be paid in cruzeiros; tax payments were not made in ORTNs.325 
In 1986, the taxpayer filed amended returns for the tax years in question.  In 
its amended returns, the taxpayer claimed a larger tax credit, computed by 
using the actual amount of cruzeiros it paid, not the ORTN amount.326 
The Court of Federal Claims ruled for the government, finding persuasive 
Revenue Ruling 91-21, which stated that “for purposes of I.R.C. § 902, the 
ORTN tax liability is the foreign income tax.”327  On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that the “Brazilian Supreme Court in 
1986 and 1987 specifically held that Brazil’s national currency was the 
cruzeiro, not the ORTN.”328  The court then expressed its disagreement with 
the Court of Federal Claims on the weight accorded to Revenue Ruling 91-21: 
 
319 Id. 
320 See id. at 1170-73. 
321 185 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
322 See id. at 1334. 
323 Id. at 1334-36. 
324 Id. at 1336. 
325 Id. at 1335. 
326 Id. at 1336. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. at 1338. 
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Although the Court of Federal Claims placed considerable reliance on 
Revenue Ruling 91-21, we find it unpersuasive.  This ruling was issued 
while AMP’s refund claims were pending with the Internal Revenue 
Service (I.R.S.).  A revenue ruling issued at a time when the I.R.S. is 
preparing to litigate is often self-serving and not generally entitled to 
deference by the courts.  See Tandy Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 
1165, 1170 . . . (1989).  This is especially true when the ruling cites no 
authority and is inconsistent with regulations and other pronouncements 
of the I.R.S.  See id. at 1170-71. 
. . . Revenue Ruling 91-21 states, without supporting authority, that 
“for the purposes of section 902 of the Code, the ORTN tax liability is the 
foreign income tax.”  This statement, in light of the prospective litigation 
between AMP and the Commissioner, is self-serving.329 
The court ultimately found that Congress had not addressed 
hyperinflationary economies until 1986 and then had done so only 
prospectively; under prior law, the cruzeiro was Brazil’s functional currency, 
as the taxpayer had argued.330 
By contrast, First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Commissioner,331 a 1998 decision 
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, was more hospitable to the 
government, though still critical of the practice of relying on rulings issued 
during the litigation.  In that case, five corporations that were wholly owned 
subsidiaries of First Chicago NBD Corporation (a bank holding company) held 
over ten percent of a Dutch bank’s voting stock.332  In an effort to take 
advantage of Code section 902(a), which provides tax benefits to “a domestic 
corporation which owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a foreign 
corporation from which it receives dividends,” the taxpayers aggregated their 
individual stakes in the Dutch company.333  The IRS disagreed that aggregation 
was permissible for this purpose, “formalizing its position in Rev. Rul. 85-
3.”334  The IRS also issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, which took 
the matter to Tax Court.335 
The Tax Court held for the IRS.336  In an opinion written by Judge Posner, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the aggregation 
question.  It pointed out that the statute in question “refers to ‘a’ corporation, 
 
329 Id. at 1338-39 (emphasis added) (quoting Rev. Rul. 91-21, 1991-1 C.B. 112). 
330 Id. at 1339. 
331 135 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’g 96 T.C. 421 (1991). 
332 Id. at 458. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 85-3, 1985-1 C.B. 222). 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
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not a group of affiliated corporations.”337  It then considered the question of 
how much weight to accord Revenue Ruling 85-3: 
The IRS has decided to read the statute literally, and a threshold issue is 
how much deference to give its reading.  The answer is that it is entitled 
to respectful consideration, but not to the deference that the Chevron 
doctrine requires in its domain. . . .   
There are plenty of gaps in the Internal Revenue Code.  But the 
authorized mode of gap-filling is by Treasury Regulations, which are 
issued after notice and an opportunity for public comment, rather than by 
Revenue Rulings.338 
The court was quick to add that the ruling was nonetheless entitled to some 
deference: 
The Internal Revenue Service knows more about the tax laws than the 
judges of the federal appellate courts do, and so it is natural for us to give 
some weight to its views about the meaning and application of those laws.  
And that is what we shall do.  The fact that the IRS first decided to give 
section 902(a) the reading embodied in Rev. Rul. 85-3 in this very case is 
not to be held too strongly against the Service, although there is a definite 
flavor of its seeking opportunistically to bolster a litigating position.  The 
aggregation issue apparently had not arisen before, even informally, so 
there would have been no occasion to issue a Revenue Ruling earlier.  It 
would be anomalous to give weight to the Service’s interpretation only in 
cases against taxpayers who come after the one who first decided to sail 
close to the wind.  A treatise on international taxation, moreover, agrees 
(and no authority that we have found disagrees) with the IRS’s reading of 
section 902.339 
The court further stated that the government’s interpretation of the statute “has 
the . . . virtue of simplifying the administration of the tax laws by avoiding 
inquiry into issues of indirect or de facto ownership.”340  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s decision that Code section 902(a) 
does not permit aggregation under Revenue Ruling 85-3.341 
Most recently, in a post-Mayo case, the Tax Court considered the level of 
deference to accord a Revenue Procedure,342 a document akin to a Revenue 
Ruling but containing procedural guidance.343  In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
 
337 Id. 
338 Id. at 458-59. 
339 Id. at 459-60 (citation omitted).  As authority for according the Revenue Ruling some 
weight, the court cited Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling 
Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1077-82 (1995). 
340 Id. at 460. 
341 Id. at 461-62. 
342 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 99, 117 (2011). 
343 See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b) (1987) (defining a Revenue Procedure as a 
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Commissioner, the taxpayer sought netting of overpayment and underpayment 
interest for 1979 and 1980,344 a period during which overpayment interest bore 
a higher interest rate than underpayment interest.345  Such netting was 
authorized by statute in 1998, both prospectively and retroactively, subject to a 
special rule that read, “Subject to any applicable statute of limitation not 
having expired with regard to either a tax underpayment or a tax 
overpayment.”346  
In Exxon Mobil, the parties stipulated that the period of limitation had not 
run “for filing suit for payment of additional overpayment interest for 1979 and 
1980.”347  In a 1999 Revenue Procedure, however, the IRS had interpreted the 
special rule to require that both the underpayment and overpayment limitations 
periods had to be open in order for netting to apply for earlier periods.348  The 
IRS argued in Exxon Mobil that the Revenue Procedure was entitled to 
Skidmore deference.349 
Departing from an earlier Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision 
that had considered the same Revenue Procedure,350 the Tax Court refused to 
 
“statement of procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the 
public under the Code and related statutes or information that, although not necessarily 
affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge”). 
344 Exxon Mobil, 136 T.C. at 103-04. 
345 Id. 
346 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3301(c)(2), 112 Stat. 741, amended by Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 4002(d), 112 Stat. 2681-
906 (1998) (cited in Exxon Mobil, 136 T.C. at 99). 
347 Exxon Mobil, 136 T.C. at 116. 
348 Rev. Proc. 99-43, 1999-2 C.B. 579, 580. 
349 Exxon Mobil, 136 T.C. at 117. 
350 FNMA v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Exxon Mobil 
explained: 
    In FNMA I a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held 
that although Rev. Proc. 99-43 . . . does not provide a basis to decide the case, the 
special rule constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity because it “discriminates 
between those claims for overpaid interest Congress has authorized and those it has 
not.”  [FNMA,  379 F.3d at] 1310. . . .  The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the 
waiver was expressly conditioned by the introductory language “Subject to any 
applicable statute of limitation not having expired”.  Thus, the Court concluded that the 
term of consent in the special rule limit a court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit, that the 
principle of strict construction had to be applied, and that the principle assumed 
“primacy over any other tools or principles of statutory construction”.  Id. at 1311 n.8.  
Therefore, the principle of strict construction required an interpretation of the special 
rule in favor of the Government.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Court 
of Federal Claims to determine whether the limitations period for the underpayment 
year was closed on July 22, 1998.  On remand, the Court of Federal Claims granted 
summary judgment to the Government.  See FNMA v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 89 
(2005), affd. 469 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  In affirming the Court of Federal Claims, 
the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position in FNMA I. 
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defer to the Revenue Procedure, calling it a “litigation position” of the IRS 
(although it had not been released in connection with the case in question): 
The revenue procedure was promulgated 16 months after the special 
rule’s enactment and states that the special rule requires that “both 
periods of limitation applicable to the tax underpayment and to the tax 
overpayment[. . . ] must have been open on July 22, 1998”.  The 
pronouncement in the revenue procedure is not supported by any analysis 
of text or legislative history or any other relevant guidance.  It is not an 
interpretation but a litigation position.351  
The court then applied Skidmore, finding that because the Revenue 
Procedure’s interpretation of the statutory special rule lacked any supporting 
rationale, it was not entitled to deference.352  The court did not cite Mayo. 
As these cases demonstrate, a number of courts have expressed concern 
about Revenue Rulings issued during litigation.  The courts generally have 
been less willing to defer to them than they have to Treasury regulations.  This 
reluctance is not surprising given the greater deference accorded regulations 
more generally, consistent with their “force of law” status under Mead and 
Mayo. 
C. Rulemaking During Litigation: A Deference Proposal 
Should “fighting regs” and rulings receive less deference?  The application 
of a new agency rule to a pending controversy – at the audit stage or later in 
the process – raises concerns about retroactivity and procedural fairness, as 
courts have recognized.353  Yet, courts have also recognized that the Treasury 
Department and the IRS have special expertise and that they may not be aware 
of an issue until the first case arises.354  Both sides of this equation contain 
 
    With all due respect to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 6621(d), as 
modified by the special rule, is a remedial statute that must be interpreted to achieve 
the remedial purpose Congress intended; i.e., taxpayer relief from disparate interest 
rates. And such an interpretation is appropriate regardless of whether the special rule 
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Exxon Mobil, 136 T.C. at 117-18. 
351 Exxon Mobil, 136 T.C. at 117 (citation omitted) (citing FNMA, 379 F.3d 1303). 
352 Id. (citation omitted)). 
353 See, e.g., Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r, 383 U.S. 272, 279 (1966); Helvering v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 306 U.S. 110, 117 (1939); Niles v. United States, 710 F.2d 1391, 
1393 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983); Intermountain Insurance Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 
211 (2010) (reviewed by the court), rev’d, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 
2011). 
354 See First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The 
fact that the IRS first decided to give section 902(a) the reading embodied in Rev. Rul. 85-3 
in this very case is not to be held too strongly against the Service, although there is a 
definite flavor of its seeking opportunistically to bolster a litigating position.  The 
aggregation issue apparently had not arisen before, even informally, so there would have 
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factual questions.  That is, the timing of a particular ruling may or may not 
prejudice the taxpayer in litigation, and a pending controversy may or may not 
reflect the first real opportunity the IRS had to apply its expertise to the issue.   
Fortunately, these are issues that can be considered under the existing 
Chevron and Skidmore regimes.  Thus, this Article proposes not to apply a 
lower standard of deference to rules issued during the pendency of a related 
controversy, but rather to consider under the applicable deference standard the 
facts surrounding the issuance of the rule.  That is, courts should consider in 
the Chevron or Skidmore deference analysis the extent of any burden or 
litigating prejudice to the taxpayer resulting from the agency’s unilateral 
ability to issue guidance that bolsters the law arguably applicable to the case.355 
This approach is particularly clear under Skidmore – and thus with respect to 
Revenue Rulings.  Recall that Skidmore stated, “The weight of . . . a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.”356  In considering “the thoroughness evident in . . . 
[the] consideration” of a Revenue Ruling and “all those factors which give it 
power to persuade,” a court can take into account whether the ruling was 
issued precipitously.  “[C]onsistency with earlier and later pronouncements” is 
also sometimes an issue for rulings issued in conjunction with pending 
litigation, as several of the cases discussed above suggest.357 
Skidmore thus works well for litigation-oriented Revenue Rulings.  Revenue 
Rulings may be faster to produce than regulations because of the lack of a 
notice-and-comment requirement under the APA.  They can therefore more 
readily be issued during the pendency of related litigation, but they will have 
been less vetted.  Skidmore, with its lower level of deference than Chevron, 
allows room for a court to ignore a Revenue Ruling. 
 
been no occasion to issue a Revenue Ruling earlier.”); see also Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 
735, 742 (1996) (stating that if pitfalls of “[s]udden and unexplained change, . . . or change 
that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, . . . are avoided, 
change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion 
provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency”); cf. Mayo Found. 
for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712 (2011) (“[W]e have found 
it immaterial to our analysis that a regulation was prompted by litigation.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
355 An analogy for this type of inquiry is the burden of proof rule in Tax Court.  The Tax 
Court’s rules provide that the burden of proof is generally on the taxpayer but is on the IRS 
with respect to “new matter, increases in deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in his 
answer.”  TAX CT. R. PRAC. & PROC. 142(a).  The IRS, however, is barred from raising a 
new issue so late as to cause surprise and prejudice.  See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN 
W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 339-40 (3rd ed. 2009). 
356 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (emphasis added). 
357 See, e.g., Fribourg, 383 U.S. at 279; AMP, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1333, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Niles, 710 F.2d at 1393. 
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Of course, Treasury can avoid Skidmore by issuing a regulation.  As 
discussed above, Treasury regulations warrant Chevron deference.358  Chevron 
provides a high level of deference, but it does contain exceptions: at step two, 
“legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”359  Thus, a regulation that is 
not “manifestly contrary to the statute” still does not warrant deference if it is 
arbitrary or capricious.360  This is a high standard, but one that is not 
necessarily insurmountable,361 particularly in a context where the Treasury 
regulation changes the law retroactively.   
No cases are directly on point, but a few cases in the regulations context 
evidence courts’ distaste for retroactivity.  As discussed above, in R.J. 
Reynolds,362 the Supreme Court refused to allow a regulation to be applied 
retroactively, though that case predated Chevron and relied on the legislative 
reenactment doctrine.  Some of the recent Son-of-BOSS statute-of-limitations 
cases also reflect a concern about retroactivity.  In Intermountain,363 the Tax 
Court applied Brand X to invalidate a regulation that had an effective date 
provision that would have resulted in retroactive application of a longer 
limitations period, though Intermountain was reversed on appeal.364  The Fifth 
Circuit did not reach the issue in Burks v. United States,365 as it decided the 
case in the taxpayer’s favor,366 but it expressed concern in dicta.367  In those 
 
358 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
359 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
360 Cf. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“Sudden and unexplained change, 
or change that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, may be 
‘arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion,’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” (citations 
omitted)); Seidenfeld, supra note 100, at 312 (explaining that under his argument that 
Chevron is founded in separation of powers doctrine, it is the “judicial responsibility to 
ensure that agencies fulfill the promise stemming from their superior expertise and 
accountability justifies courts taking an active oversight role over agency interpretations of 
statutes”). 
361 Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011) (finding “the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ . . . policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the 
Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed provision of the 
immigration laws . . . arbitrary and capricious” under the APA).  
362 Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 117 (1939). 
363 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010) (reviewed by 
the court), rev’d, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). 
364 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476 
(D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). 
365 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011). 
366 See id. 
367 Id. at 360 n.9.  In Home Concrete, the Fourth Circuit also declined to apply the 
regulation retroactively, conducting an analysis of when retroactivity is appropriate.  See 
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 256-58 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011). 
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cases, courts did not apply Chevron, but, in future cases, courts could find a 
regulation arbitrary or capricious under Chevron, particularly if it prejudices 
the taxpayer and its timing appears to reflect opportunism rather than careful 
application of the agency’s expertise. 
This proposal generally is consistent with the approach of the ABA Task 
Force on Judicial Deference, in that it would apply Chevron to valid Treasury 
regulations.  The Task Force’s Report argued, “Regulations issued in response 
to pending litigation should be entitled to Chevron deference.  Generally, the 
period a regulation is outstanding is not relevant, even where a regulation is 
issued in connection with pending litigation.  This is one issue as to which the 
case law is clear.”368  The Task Force’s Report also stated, however, “Although 
National Muffler does emphasize the timing and manner in which a regulation 
evolved, the Task Force does not believe that timing should prevent the IRS 
from changing its view if appropriate notice-and-comment issuance procedures 
are followed.”369  Although this Article does not argue that National Muffler 
should apply, it does argue that the timing of the regulation is an issue a court 
should be able to consider under the applicable deference standard (Chevron or 
Skidmore). 
This proposal offers the benefit of application of existing standards that have 
well-developed bodies of precedent.  It also avoids creating an exception for 
tax cases, which the Court in Mayo was loath to do in a related context.  It does 
mean that “fighting regs” are likely to be upheld, since Chevron is a difficult 
hurdle to overcome, but that consequence follows from Smiley and Mayo.   
The good news in this regard is that Treasury’s issuance of a regulation 
benefitting from Chevron deference generally requires the notice-and-comment 
procedures under the APA to be followed,370 which takes time and results in 
feedback to the agency.  The bad news is that the Treasury has found a short 
cut.  It often issues temporary regulations in conjunction with proposed 
regulations, as it did in the Home Concrete line of cases.371  By issuing 
temporary regulations rather than merely proposed regulations, Treasury can 
attempt to increase the deference accorded its position,372 and by issuing them 
 
368 Salem et al., supra note 112, at 742-43 (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 
(1996)); Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 115 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 1998); Barnhart 
v. Wilson, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)).  See also Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 940 
F. Supp. 1370, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (applying Chevron to a Treasury regulation and stating 
that “[e]ven if the Treasury Department drafted Regulation § 1.809-9 with the litigation in 
mind, it had the authority to do so as long as it used proper procedures and the end result 
was consistent with the statute’s language and purpose”). 
369 Salem et al., supra note 112, at 743. 
370 See supra text accompanying notes 30-35. 
371 See supra text accompanying notes 214-216. 
372 Proposed regulations are not intended to have the force of law, see supra note 212 and 
accompanying text, and this should not benefit from Chevron deference, see supra text 
accompanying note 213. 
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at the same time as the proposed regulations, Treasury can avoid waiting.  The 
availability of this approach increases the importance of proper procedure; 
regulations issued with the force of law should be held to the requirements of 
the APA.  The temporary regulations at issue in the Intermountain-Home 
Concrete line of cases, for example, did not undergo notice and comment, and 
thus warrant further examination of their validity. 
Although both Mayo and Mead state that notice and comment is not an 
absolute prerequisite to Chevron deference, they also make clear that it is an 
extremely important factor.373  Post-promulgation comments simply are not the 
same, so they should not be considered a substitute for comments that are 
considered before the regulation is finalized.374 
If courts lean hard on the Treasury with respect to regulations that did not 
receive the benefit of notice and comment before being finalized, that should 
encourage the Treasury to use more sparingly the technique of simultaneously 
issuing temporary and proposed regulations.  That approach should be limited 
to situations that fall within the “good cause” exception of the APA.375 
The practical effect of the proposed deference approach would be to require 
the Treasury to take more time and engage in greater deliberation before 
issuing a regulation prompted by pending litigation, unless the regulation fits 
within the APA’s “good cause” exception.  If the Treasury follows proper 
procedure, the regulation will receive substantial deference, but the regulation 
that receives that deference may very well not contain the same substantive 
content as one that was issued more quickly and without public input.  This 
approach thus entails little change in current substantive law, but it emphasizes 
the importance of deliberative procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The level of deference courts should accord administrative pronouncements 
is a thorny but important issue that becomes even more complicated when the 
guidance is issued during the course of a related controversy.  Conceptually, 
the level of deference that courts should accord such litigation-oriented 
regulations and rulings depends on (1) what deference is accorded those 
authorities outside this specialized context and (2) what adjustment, if any, 
should be made for the timing of the rule in question.   
This Article has argued that all Treasury regulations should be subject to 
Chevron deference, as Mayo provides, rather than deference under the tax-
specific National Muffler decision or an even lower level of deference, such as 
Skidmore, as Mitchell Gans argued.  It has further argued in favor of the well-
accepted approach that, following Mead, Revenue Rulings should be given 
deference under Skidmore. 
 
373 See supra text accompanying notes 101-105. 
374 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
375 See supra text accompanying notes 114-119. 
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With respect to the specific context of litigation-oriented rulemaking, the 
Article has argued that the timing of the issuance of the rule and, if applicable, 
its retroactivity, should be taken into account under the otherwise applicable 
deference standard (Chevron or Skidmore).  That would leave substantial room 
for courts to disregard Revenue Rulings they find abusive.  Regulations would 
be harder to invalidate but could be found arbitrary or capricious in some 
cases. 
The government could try to rely on temporary regulations, as it did in the 
Son-of-BOSS cases, but temporary regulations, since they are designed to have 
the force of law, risk being invalidated if they did not go through the notice 
and comment process.  Requiring that process as a prerequisite for Chevron 
deference would both increase the vetting of the regulation and slow down the 
rulemaking process, reducing the government’s incentive to issue “fighting 
regs.” 
 
